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 Preface 
 
This benchmarking study was initiated in late 2004 by the CRO Forum, which includes 13 
major European insurance companies and financial conglomerates. The study provides a 
qualitative benchmark towards Solvency II for the insurance regulators to assess internal 
models. It should foster the discussion about the application of internal risk capital models for 
legal solvency purposes. 
 
Organizational support was provided by a core team (Allianz, AXA, SwissRe), while we, 
Damir Filipovic (Chair for Financial and Insurance Mathematics at the University of Munich) 
and Daniel Rost (Assistant Professor) were responsible for the set-up and the evaluation of a 
questionnaire that was sent out to the member companies in January 2005. We received the 
fully completed answers from 12 companies and one partially filled out questionnaire. In 
addition, the Swiss Federal Office of Private Insurance (BPV), De Nederlandsche Bank 
(DNB) and the German Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin) contributed 
their answers where appropriate regarding their views on internal and their regulatory 
standard models – the Swiss Solvency Test (SST) and the Financial Assessment Framework 
(Financieel toetsingskader/FTK).  
 
We met with representatives of all 13 participating risk management groups. During these 
interviews we obtained numerous useful and constructive comments. We would like to thank 
to all those individuals who have provided support and input on this report. 
 
Damir Filipovic and Daniel Rost, University of Munich, April 2005 
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 1 Introduction 
 
This study shall provide a benchmark and guidelines towards Solvency II for the insurance 
regulators to assess internal models. The results of the study are a contribution of the CRO 
Forum to the Solvency II project. It should foster the discussion about the application of 
internal risk capital models for legal solvency – both Pillar 1 and 2 – purposes.  
 
The CRO Forum delegated to us the duty to carry through and deliver a study with the 
following terms of reference: 
 
• Take inventory of the risk measurement frameworks used by the CRO Forum member 
companies 
• Evaluate strengths and weaknesses of various frameworks and compare them with the 
standard solvency models developed by the Swiss and Dutch insurance regulators 
• Provide a common denominator of the analysed internal risk models (“minimum 
standards”) 
• Propose a summary of principles supported by the CRO Forum member companies 
• Develop a glossary of common terminology 
 
The scope is on internal group capital adequacy. Other aspects, such as performance 
measurement or compliance with rating agency demands, may require different concepts of 
value and risk. The focus is on integrated internal models of the group, where group refers to 
the top level of the companies. This could be a conglomerate of different financial sectors or a 
stand alone life insurance business. All other levels are referred to as sub-units; this includes 
business, legal or other entities.  
 
The main part of this report anonymizes and summarizes the comments and answers to the 
questionnaire from the participating companies (we received one partially and 12 fully 
completed questionnaires). In addition, the Swiss Federal Office of Private Insurance (BPV), 
De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) and the German Bundesanstalt für 
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin) contributed their answers where appropriate regarding 
their views on internal and their regulatory standard models – the Swiss Solvency Test (SST) 
and the Financial Assessment Framework (Financieel toetsingskader/FTK). These are 
essentially quoted as original text where applicable. So are excerpts from the report by the 
Insurer Solvency Assessment Working Party of the International Actuarial Association (IAA) 
where appropriate. 
 
This report is organized as follows 
• Section 3 – “Participating institutions” summarizes the business activities, areas of 
application of internal models and risk profiles of the participants. 
• Section 4 – “Internal models” places the analysed internal models in the landscape of 
regulatory and industrial standards; describes future developments and the major 
obstacles in development and use of internal models; and provides a summary of 
proposals supported by the participants for the admissibility of internal models.   
• Section 5 – “Glossary” provides a glossary of common terminology 
• Section 6 – “Capital adequacy” reviews the high level concepts for risk tolerance, 
solvency, available and required risk capital 
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• Section 7 – “Valuation of assets and liabilities” describes the valuation principles for 
assets and liabilities  
• Section 8 – “Modelling of risk variables and dependencies” describes the modelling 
principles for the major risk types; and provides a risk model classification 
• Section 9 – “Aggregation and diversification” analyses the diversification effects in 
the aggregation of risks and points out some difficulties (fungibility) and pitfalls 
• Section 10 – “Risk measurement” classifies the risk measurement methods; and 
describes their mathematical implementation 
• Section 11 – “Risk steering and capital allocation” reviews the structures and methods 
for the allocation of risk capital and risk taking capacities 
• Section 12 – “Model implementation and infrastructure” provides a survey of model 
assessment, processes, tools and data management  
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 2 Executive Summary 
 
This study has been prepared for the Chief Risk Officer (CRO) Forum to contribute to the 
Solvency II project. It provides a qualitative benchmark and guidelines towards Solvency II – 
both Pillar 1 and 2 – for the insurance regulators to assess internal models. 
 
To foster the discussion about the application of internal risk capital models for legal solvency 
purposes, this study evaluates the risk measurement frameworks used by the CRO Forum 
member companies and compares them with the solvency model proposals of the 
International Actuarial Association (IAA), and the Swiss, Dutch and German insurance 
regulators.  
 
To start with, there is a variety of methods in use. There exists currently no fully consistent 
common denominator of the analysed frameworks. This is, on one hand, caused by the lack of 
standards and also by the different actuarial traditions in the European countries. On the other 
hand, this is – at least partially – due to the fact that some components of the internal models 
were originally designed by different external consultants. As a result, this report does not 
primarily provide minimum standards but rather a characterization and classification of the 
various methodologies. It evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of the analyzed frameworks 
and proposes a summary of principles supported by the CRO Forum member companies for 
the admissibility of internal models. 
 
This classification of methodologies comprises: 
• Capital adequacy: 
o Solvency point of view: economic, regulatory, rating agency 
o Level point of view: group vs. sub-unit 
o Capital point of view: policyholder vs. shareholder 
• Liability valuation: statutory vs. market consistent 
• Risk modelling: scenario based, static factor model, covariance model, stochastic 
factor model 
• Scenario definitions: event/hypothesis, deterministic projection, randomly generated 
sample path, sensitivity or stress test 
• Risk measurement 
o Time horizon: one-year vs. multi-year 
o Risk measure: VaR, TailVaR, target ruin probability 
o Aggregation: risk numbers vs. overall P&L distribution 
 
The main problem regarding consistency with Solvency II is the conflict of structures: legal 
entities vs. business units. For an internal model to be truly embedded in the management 
process, the Solvency II regime should allow for reflection of management structures. This 
requires a clear definition and standardization of the notion of contingent capital to account 
for diversification effects between subsidiaries and group level. 
 
Participating institutions (Section 3) 
 
The participants of this study can be characterized as worldwide operating (re-)insurance 
companies, partly financial conglomerates, with a broad range of business activities and 
heterogeneous business profiles. 
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When breaking down the use of the integrated internal models to the different areas of 
application, the core observations are: 
• A high degree of (partial) usage of internal models especially in the typical “risk 
businesses”, like risk steering, asset liability management, allocation of capital and 
risk taking activities (degree of application higher than 75%.) 
• Internal models are becoming an operational management tool, notably for 
underwriting policies, performance measurement, and management compensation. 
However, the degree of usage for management compensation is still rather low. 
 
All participants employ a hierarchical structure with sub-units on legal, country, and/or lines 
of business basis leading to important and acknowledged differences between risk profiles at 
group and sub-unit levels. We recommend that special attention is given to  
? systematic risks which emanate at group level from the aggregation of relatively non-
material risks at sub-unit level (e.g. pandemics); 
? additional regulatory risks at group level where fungibility aspects have to be taken 
into account.   
 
Internal models (Section 4) 
 
Internal models are expected to reflect each company’s individual risk exposures more 
appropriately than just applying standardised rules driven by jurisdiction or regulators.  
 
The impact of certain external model providers cannot be ignored. However, most internal 
models meet the overall objectives of the IAA proposed solvency assessment principles. The 
major differences to the IAA proposals concern 
• confidence level; 
• aggregation method (copulas proposed by the IAA not prevalent); 
• risk measure (VaR is predominant); 
• capital point of view (a few participants base their model on a shareholder point of 
view); 
• concept of default and solvency (statutory instead of market consistent liability values 
used by some participants). 
Moreover, some local models – used in sub-units – are related to industry (Moody’s, S&P’s) 
or statutory standards (e.g. US RBC).  
 
An integrated internal model comprises methodology, parameters, tools and processes. The 
main obstacles in developing and using the internal model and its flexibility towards Solvency 
II lie on the process side, e.g. 
• human resources (inflexible structures, the lack of cooperation, insight, skill and 
knowledge are source of delay, errors and mismanagement); 
• data problems (data quality, reliability and availability in connection with tough 
timelines, lack of data underlying estimation, efficient storage). 
Moreover, changing the technical and process implementation of the model might be a huge, 
material, and costly task, since many sub-units are involved. 
 
There is a trade-off between flexibility towards developments and adjustments to future 
requirements and “user friendliness” of internal models. When it comes to the individual 
assessment of separate risk types, business lines and legal entities, essentially all participants 
believe in the modularity and flexibility of their internal models. At least 1/4 of the 
participants revealed their intention for their internal models to replace the future regulatory 
standard approach entirely.  
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Preferably the internal model is fully stochastic based, generating an overall P&L distribution 
(stochastic factor model). On the other hand, it can be expected that a modular approach 
aggregating single risk numbers will be the core of a future Solvency II standard assessment. 
It is therefore recommended that: 
? The internal model is kept flexible enough to assess separate risk types, business lines 
and legal entities individually. 
? The regulators should, however, allow internal models to replace the future regulatory 
standardized approach entirely (especially when the company has already 
implemented a stochastic factor model). 
? The risk assessment should be flexible towards the time horizon; there is no ultimate 
preference of one-year to multi-year models (indeed, about 1/3 of the participants have 
currently implemented or plan to implement a multi-year risk assessment model). 
However, for sake of comparability every model should be calibratable to an annual 
confidence level (taking into account an appropriate risk margin for the liabilities).  
 
The participants are ready to meet Solvency II requirements including public disclosure of 
methodology and assumptions if the regulations allow for flexibility, showing “business 
sense” and do not lead to rising capital requirements. Here is a selection of principles 
supported by the participants for the admissibility of internal models extending the IAA 
proposals: 
? Usage of internal model as a truly embedded management tool 
? Internal models based on realistic economic factors and assumptions 
? Detailed documentation to include implementation and development, deviation from 
the regulatory standard model, impact of reinsurance and diversification, etc. 
? Minimum list of business and risks to be assessed (no cherry picking of low capital 
business units) 
? Minimum standards for calibration, parameter selection, stress testing, diversification 
(including fungibility) 
? Capital adequacy at group level, allowing for diversification mitigation 
? Public disclosure of methodology and assumptions 
? Clear definitions concerning the time horizon 
? Internal model is more than just stressing the balance sheet – new business must not 
jeopardize the sufficiency of current assets 
? Criteria from the banking sector should be reflected and revised for admissibility for 
insurance models 
? Regular assessments and continuous development of internal models; clear processes 
for approval of model changes 
? One lead regulator co-ordinating with other regulatory bodies. 
 
Capital adequacy (Section 6) 
 
Essentially all participants agree that the economic view of the world provides the most 
accurate picture of the risk profile and capital adequacy. However, it is also recognised that in 
a realistic model there are regulatory and rating agency constraints to be met. 
 
The assessment of capital adequacy depends on the solvency (economic, regulatory, rating 
agency), level (group, sub-unit), and capital (policyholder, shareholder) point of view. 
 
Currently, there are various perspectives in use, which is due to the different accounting 
systems and the complexity inherent in determining the capital structure. We recommend that 
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for comparability of the capital adequacy between the companies, further effort is invested to 
achieve consistency between the internal methodologies and concepts. 
 
Valuation of assets and liabilities (Section 7) 
 
It is understood that those assets and liabilities are considered for capital adequacy assessment 
which are material from an economic point of view, and are expected to give rise to or to 
influence future cash flows from an economic point of view. 
 
Throughout the companies, assets are valued on a market consistent basis. That is, assets are 
marked to market if a market value is available and otherwise marked to model. 
 
As for the valuation of liabilities there is currently no industry standard. There are essentially 
three basic approaches for the valuation of liabilities in use: best estimate, best estimate plus 
risk margin, or statutory values. 
 
We recommend that the best estimate of the liabilities comprises any market consistent value 
with no explicit margin for insurance technical risk (such as mortality level risk). Market 
consistency would require to taking into account policyholder participation and all embedded 
options and guarantees subject to market risk.  
 
A risk margin, reflecting prudence in a market consistent way, may be added on top of the 
best estimate. This margin is to be distinguished from any additional solvency capital required 
for e.g. a target rating. We do not recommend that the risk margin is defined as a quantile of 
some loss distribution without linking it to an economic argument. 
 
Modelling of risk variables and dependencies (Section 8) 
 
An internal risk-based capital adequacy system should go beyond absorbing the normal 
business fluctuations. The sources of randomness are uncertain cash flows and future asset 
and liability values, which again are caused by more fundamental underlying random risk 
factors. It is understood that these risk factors are categorized under the four major headings 
market risk, credit risk, insurance risk (underwriting risk), and operational risk. Following is a 
selection of comments and recommendations: 
 
Operational risks: about 1/3 of the participants are using and/or developing stochastic 
operational risk models. It is recommended that a clear and standardized sub-classification of 
operational risks is developed as a step towards a systematic quantitative assessment. 
 
Intra-group risks: 2/3 of the participants do not consider intra-group risks at group level 
(netting out assumption). It is recommended that internal models are developed towards 
capturing the real side effects of intra-group transactions, at least qualitatively, say by a 3-4 
year cash-flow test. 
 
Model uncertainty: there is no clear trend and homogeneity among the participants. It is 
recommended that model uncertainty is – in a first step – qualitatively assessed. Important is 
to know the sensitivity of the results towards variations of the key parameters.  
 
The analyzed risk models can be categorized in scenario based models, static factor models, 
covariance models, and stochastic factor models. Many participants start with calibrating a 
stochastic factor model, and translate it in a tabular form, which is then practically used as a 
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covariance model. This is claimed to serve for better communication between the risk 
management unit and the rest of the staff. We believe that this is a matter of culture and 
education, which can be improved and adapted if necessary. 
 
We recommend that an aggregate P&L distribution is considered in any case, since only then 
one can trade off the capital adequacy and confidence level.  
 
As for dependencies, a mixture of correlations, copulas and tail adjustment are in use. It is 
recommended that dependencies are consistently modelled across different levels: central 
simulation of market risk factors and specific catastrophe events taking account of the 
geographic reach of such catastrophe events 
 
It is further recommended that the shortcomings of correlation aggregation are mitigated, 
using “tail-correlations”, back-tested by full stochastic models including copulas and 
replacing stand alone VaRs by TailVaRs for very heavy tailed loss distributions, to capture 
the potential losses beyond the quantile. 
 
Scenarios form an important part of risk models. Scenarios can be categorized in 
event/hypothesis, deterministic projection, randomly generated sample path, and 
sensitivity/stress test. These concepts are multiply used by all participants. 
 
As for the time horizon of the risk assessment, about 1/4 of the participants use or plan to use 
a multi-year horizon. It is recommend that, beyond a one-year risk assessment, (stochastic) 
multi-year studies are performed, such as the FTK continuity test. This includes a 
comprehensive qualitative group-wide liquidity test on a time horizon which allows for 
realistic refinancing programs (e.g. 2-4 years). 
 
As for reinsurance, 3/4 of the participants take reinsurance into account for risk mitigation, 
and at the same time, take account of reinsurance default. It is recommended that reinsurance 
default is correlated with equity markets and catastrophe losses, and reinsurance concentration 
risk is minimized by diversification. Insurance cash flows should be modelled net and gross of 
reinsurance to test for the credit risk exposure.  
 
Aggregation, diversification, and fungibility of capital (Section 9) 
 
It is understood that stand alone risks for sub-units are aggregated to a higher (e.g. group) 
level, converted in capital equivalent which is then allocated to the sub-units. In both steps – 
aggregation and allocation – diversification effects, which are the core of the insurance 
industry business, come into play. This results in less capital being needed at group level for 
supporting the sub-units than it would be needed on a standalone basis (“the need of the sum 
is less than the sum of the needs”). As a consequence, the sub-units will have to support each 
other in case of distress. So, for diversification to really work at a group level it needs to be 
ensured that if capital is held in several sub-units it will be able to flow freely from one sub-
unit to the other in case of need (fungibility). In practice, this might not be the case for e.g. the 
following reasons: 
• The company’s management may be unwilling to provide the necessary capital 
injection. 
• The regulators may prevent capital to be transferred from the legal entities under their 
jurisdiction (regulatory risk). 
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Since all participating financial conglomerates take full account of diversification benefits 
between insurance and banking business at group level, and essentially all participants 
measure diversification benefits between their local entities, it is necessary that fungibility 
restrictions are taken into account as realistically as possible (it may be interesting to note that 
the assumption of perfect fungibility will presumably not be acceptable for the SST). The 
major difficulty for quantifying regulatory fungibility restrictions is the possible inconsistency 
of business and legal structures. We recommend that: 
? Fungibility of capital is to be assessed under financial distress situations. Taking into 
account solely the transferability constraints on the available capital under normal 
situations may underestimate the risk of illiquidity. 
? Since fungibility restrictions seem to have never been a practical problem for the 
participants, a case study of fungibility issues under financial distress should be 
performed. 
? For the sake of comparability of regulatory and economic capital structure, a legal 
entity compatible diversification allocation model should be developed. 
? Minimum capital requirements (MCR) for legal entities and a standardization of the 
notion of contingent capital to cover the MCR are to be defined. 
 
Risk measurement (Section 10) 
 
The risk measurement methods can be classified by the time horizon of the assessment and 
the risk measure (VaR, TailVaR, or target ruin probability). It seems to become an industry 
standard to calibrate target confidence levels to annualized VaR. That does not mean that VaR 
shall be the ultimate risk measure. It is recommended that the internal risk models produce 
aggregate P&L probability distributions, so that their risk measurement can easily be 
benchmarked with the standard annualized VaR. Moreover, for one-year risk measurements, 
an explicit risk margin should be included to assert the continuation of business after a one-
year financial distress. This risk margin should be calibrated such that it accounts for the cost 
of capital to run off the liabilities in a going concern context. Example: SST risk margin. 
 
The internal annualized VaR calibrated confidence levels at group level range from 99.6% to 
beyond 99.99%. Apparently, these confidence levels are not the only factor driving the rating. 
About 2/3 of the participants aim at a “AA” rating, while their confidence levels vary within a 
range of 99.8% to 99.98%. 
 
Risk steering and capital allocation (Section 11) 
 
As insurance is a complex industry there are often key variations in local products, guarantees 
etc. Therefore, a group wide internal model will need to take into account the thoroughness of 
a bottom-up approach if it is to be used for risk appetite decisions rather then just high level 
capital allocation and performance measurement. 
 
Model implementation and infrastructure (Section 12) 
 
Model implementation and infrastructure is about model assessment, governance and audit 
processes, IT questions, and data management. Following is an extract of observations: 
 
Governance and audit processes: 
• rely on an independent (from business responsibilities) internal risk management unit 
• have to include the senior management  
• can be supported by external consultants assisting in the risk assessment process 
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IT questions and problems: 
• a great variety of IT platforms and systems in use  
• harmonization of the systems no issue for more than half of the companies 
• software is developed in-house or at least operated by in-house resources  
 
Data management: 
• update, feed, adjustments, source, and lack of data are greatest concerns  
 
Model implementation and infrastructure is a material issue for the companies, very 
demanding with respect to human resources and still a broad field for improvement. 
 
It is expected that regulators would prefer a partial model with methodological drawbacks but 
which is truly embedded in the management process showing a clear model implementation 
and infrastructure to a perhaps technically refined “window model”.  
 
In view of Solvency II, the overall aim is to establish an open and transparent risk culture on 
which basis the internal model can continually be discussed within the company as well as 
with the regulators. 
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 3 Participating institutions 
  
We received data and information from 13 companies – hereinafter referred to as 
“participants”.  
 
In addition, the Swiss Federal Office of Private Insurance (BPV), De Nederlandsche Bank 
(DNB) and the German Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin) contributed 
their views where applicable on internal and their regulatory standard models – the Swiss 
Solvency Test (SST) and the Financial Assessment Framework (Financieel 
toetsingskader/FTK).  
 
3.1 Business activities  
 
The participants were asked to report their activities in direct insurance (life, non-life, health), 
reinsurance (life, non-life, health), banking, and investment. The length of the upper bar in the 
following diagram represents the number of participants with the activities set up on the left 
margin. 
  
 
Business activities
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
others
investment
banking
fin re
health re
non-life re
life re
direct health
direct non-life
direct life
Number of companies
business activity in the group
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Note that we have also counted the activities which constitute only a small part of the 
participants’ business program or which are in the run-off, but still on the balance sheet. This 
was observed in a few cases especially in the banking and investment sector and in the health 
reinsurance subcategory. Activities mentioned among “others” were credit & surety and 
equity release. 
 
The participants were also asked to tell which of the above activities were (or are to be) 
covered by their integrated internal model. This comprises risk and governance processes on 
one hand and financial modelling methodology on the other. As it is seen from the lower bar 
in the above diagram the coverage rate in nearly every sector is (almost) 100%. This may be 
explained by 
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• the crisis on the stock exchange market in 2001 has given a strong impact on risk 
assessment and risk modelling 
• big companies have the resources and sufficient staff in order to be able to introduce 
internal models and thus already heading for a future Solvency II assessment 
• the complexity of a firm structure might demand for an integrated internal model 
 
The high coverage rates as shown in the above diagram are the ground for this survey 
investigating integrated internal models. 
 
 
BaFin 
BaFin supervises all of the above activities. 
BaFin prefers “integrated internal models” in the sense that common risk drivers (like interest 
rates) are used “top-down” such that the group-level model has access to the exposure data 
(=position data) in a uniform fashion across business units. We are aware that such “top-
down” models are more difficult to build and maintain and that they tend to lack precision at 
the lower levels of aggregation. Hence, we are prepared to also accept “bottom-up” models 
that are better suited for modelling the risk at the individual business units. The results of the 
sub-models are then to be “aggregated” at group level. The key point is that the aggregation 
usually has to work on probability distributions, not just numbers. We also see that some 
companies use different models for different levels of aggregation. In such a case, the 
regulatory capital requirement should be based on the top-level model, but the “use test” will 
look at the whole risk management process and thus also at the lower-level models 
 
3.2 Areas of application of internal models 
 
In the following diagram, the length of the bars gives the number of the participants with the 
different status of usage for the areas of application of their internal models. 
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Areas of application mentioned among “others” were Solvency II, rating agency analysis, 
purchase of reinsurance and determining fair values. 
 
It follows that for the typical “risk businesses” (risk steering, ALM, risk taking activities, 
capital allocation) the degree of application of internal models is higher than 75%. But it is 
important to note that only about half of the participants use their internal model for 
management compensation at this time, in full use within only 2 out of 13. The usage of the 
integrated internal model for management compensation can be considered as an indicator of 
the acceptability of the internal model, both internally and externally. 
 
With only a very few participants, the internal model has been in partial (for “risk business” 
purposes, see above) use before 2000. In most companies the construction, invention, and 
implementation of an internal model began after the turn of the century (2001-2004), and this 
is still an ongoing process with most of the participants (see the “intended for (partial) use” 
checks in the diagram above). Some state of completion is envisaged for 2006/2007. 
 
The integrated internal models serve a whole bandwidth of purposes within the companies. 
They will not only be used in connection with risk measurement but will also underlie 
performance measurement, steering, underwriting and reserving. Thus, the integrated internal 
model is becoming the core for the company’s activities and performance and therefore 
cannot be ignored by the regulators. 
However, the alleged use of an internal model does not prove its true embedding in the 
management process yet. Indeed, this will be one of the key aspects for the regulators on their 
stay with the companies when judging the internal models with respect to methodology, areas 
of application and degree of implementation (see also Chapter 12). 
 
BaFin 
The first nine points are possible aspects of the “use test”. The key question of the use test is 
whether the risk management processes - based on the internal model and steered by the 
management board - are working properly. 
 
3.3 Risk profiles at group and sub-unit levels 
 
About 10 participants confirm that there are important differences between risk profiles at 
group and sub-unit levels stemming from the fact that: 
 
• Some risks are not written or considered in the sub-units, but only at group level (e.g. 
major natural catastrophes, management of assets, operational risk, and regulatory 
risks as pointed out in the comments by BPV below). 
• There is diversification across the sub-units, leading to the effect that there are risks 
important for a sub-unit which are “diversified away” on group level. Also, individual 
sub-units may have opposite exposure to some risk factors (e.g. negative vs. positive 
sensitivity to interest rates) so that the overall group risk position may be opposite to 
that of an individual sub-unit.  
• The risk profiles of different sub-units differ. 
 
Those few participants which declined any major difference in the risk profiles were rather 
referring to risk profiles of different sub-units, and not in comparison to risks at group level. 
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These participants were either concentrating on specials lines of business or had a very 
homogenous product structure across sub-units.  
 
We recommend that special attention is given to systematic risks which emanate at group 
level from the aggregation of relatively non-material risks at sub-unit level (e.g. pandemics). 
Scenario based methods may be needed. Also fungibility aspects have to be taken into 
account at group level. 
 
BPV 
The SST has a legal entity view (Swiss business + branches). However if diversification 
benefits on target capital are to be accepted by FOPI, the group would need to model the 
group risk and the allocation down to legal entity. 
The two main additional risks to be modelled then are 
a) regulatory risk: The risk that  regulators from other legal entities might freeze assets (SCR 
or MCR) and the remainder of the group then is in a worse financial situation (fungibility of 
capital). 
b) The risk, that the group might let subgroups (in particular the legal entity in the scope of 
the SST) be sent into run-off.  
 
BaFin 
This was discussed in the corresponding CEIOPS working group. One of the additional risks 
identified were reputation risks. 
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 4 Internal Models 
 
It is generally agreed that there shall be two alternatives to calculate regulatory solvency 
capital requirements – a standardised method and the internal model method. Under a 
standardised approach, capital would be determined using the same calculations for all 
companies in a jurisdiction, in accordance with the to-be-developed European Solvency II 
standards. This would necessarily be a simple rule-based one-size-fits-all method, such as a 
static factor model, where for each source of risk a standardised measure of a company’s 
exposure to that risk would be multiplied by a standardised factor determined for the 
jurisdiction as a whole. Similarly, the rating agencies’ models are of rule-based type. Internal 
models are expected to reflect each company’s individual risk exposures more appropriately. 
 
4.1 Positioning to regulatory and industry standards 
 
The Financial Assessment Framework (FTK) of the DNB requires that “an internal model 
must model the probability distribution of shareholders’ equity at realistic value at a horizon 
of one year after the reporting date”.  
 
A probability distribution is not targeted by all internal models that have been analysed in this 
study (even though, in principle they all do implicitly). The majority of the internal models lie 
between a standardised approach and the FTK probability distribution type. 
 
Most internal models are developed from first principles, ensuring that the risk profile of the 
group and sub-units is appropriately reflected. One cannot ignore, however, the impact of 
certain external model providers, which results in a kind of modelling culture clustering 
across the participants. 
 
As for the (economic) valuation principles, the majority of internal models meet the overall 
objectives and ambitions of the IAA standards, such as marking the balance sheet to market. 
The major differences to the IAA proposals are  
• Confidence level: the participants use higher target confidence levels than 99%. 
• Aggregation method: the IAA proposes copulas, while they are not so prevalently 
implemented in practice (they are, however, used for back testing). 
• Risk measure: the IAA proposes TailVaR. In practice, VaR is predominant. 
• Capital point of view: while the IAA takes a policyholder point of view, a few 
participants base their model on a shareholder point of view (different discount 
factors, etc). 
• Concept of default and solvency: the IAA proposes to compare market value of assets 
and liabilities, some participants use statutory liability values instead. 
• Local models in use may be related to either industry standard (like Moody’s, S&P’s) 
or to statutory standards (like US RBC), due to the need to monitor the statutory 
position at business unit level. 
 
The FTK, SST and BaFin share in principle the views of the IAA proposals. It is noteworthy 
that some participants (not solely Swiss insurers) explicitly mention to be “reasonably close” 
to the SST framework. 
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As for the rating agencies, their impact is mainly due to providing the target rating for many 
participants (AA rating or higher). Also market and credit risk is sometimes modelled 
according to industry standards, such as the S&P credit capital charge approach. 
 
For the model implementation, there are many commercial tools in use. See Section 12.3.1 
“IT platforms and infrastructure” for further account. 
  
BPV 
Operational risk is not quantified; the SST is not a factor/RBC model as proposed by IAA. 
The market risk (ALM) part of the model is closely related to the RiskMetrics approach. The 
credit risk part is Basel 2, the P&C part mirrors closely the methodology of many internal 
models. 
 
BaFin 
Our views are principally in line with the IAA proposals. Additional ideas that have not yet 
been widely discussed are presented in the attached “BaFin White Paper on Internal Models – 
Key Issues”. We expect a variety of internal models. 
 
4.2 Future developments of internal models 
 
An integrated internal model is more than just an own way of calculating available and 
required risk capital. Indeed, it can and must be considered as a common framework for 
discussion of risks, of dependencies, of links between different areas of the business etc. It 
comprises 
 
• Methodology: assumptions, models, mathematics, mapping of the real world to a 
conceptual framework, etc. 
• Parameters: interest rates, volatilities, mortality tables, dependencies, allocation 
numbers, estimates based on financial or insurance data or on expert opinion, etc. 
• Tools: software codes, data warehouses, IT platforms, etc. 
• Processes: testing, plausibility checks, reporting, documentation, implementation, 
model building, construction and enforcement, integration of sub-units and 
management into the model, etc. 
 
Although these four categories are not clearly separated (the construction of data interfaces, 
for example, might belong to tools and processes) they may serve as benchmarks. 
 
It follows that an internal model cannot be a static object but is subject to continuous changes 
and developments due to 
o changes in the company’s structure 
o evolvement of markets and technology 
o scientific (mathematical and statistical) progress 
o changes in the political and legal environment 
 
The participants were asked to comment on future developments of their integrated internal 
models. Most of them gave exhaustive answers from which we present a short survey: 
 
Methodology:   
• refine reserving model  
• tail value at risk approach in some applications 
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• extend to multi-year modelling 
• include 5 years’ of new business 
• extend range of risk factors modelled 
• introduce analytical approach to operational risk 
• include credit risk methodology in insurance 
• capture emerging hedging strategies 
• integrate ALM analysis into embedded value work 
• development in life business (AL-dynamics) 
• more detailed analysis of non-life pricing risk 
• new approach in loss modelling 
 
Parameters:  
• alter time horizon in risk assessment 
• adjust risk tolerance to regulatory evolution 
• align ALM parameters in insurance   
• sourcing higher quality of internal and market data on volatilities and correlations 
• review of aggregation matrix 
   
Tools:   
• implementation of appropriate new scenario generators 
• explore the use of an alternative platform of the model 
• development of Excel based models 
• roll out new software to provide a common platform for both risk management and 
internal audit 
• evolve the P&C projection system 
   
Processes:  
• building a fully integrated bottom-up model 
• extending computation to lower levels of granularity 
• reappraisal of the IT infrastructure 
• build a legal entity version of the model 
• integration of sub-units into the integrated internal model 
• strengthening documentation and checks 
• integration into standard data systems and automatic calculations 
• create a central repository for the collection and storage of risk driver and                                 
exposure of liability data 
• derive faster (quarterly) updates 
• include behaviour of management, rating agencies and regulators in internal model 
• improve external acceptance by the regulators and rating agencies 
• improve system robustness 
   
The main fields of future development are methodology and processes. This is not very 
surprising since most of the participants are still in the building-up phase of their internal 
model (2 participants, however, have stated explicitly that no major changes were planned on 
the methodology side).  
 
We can sum up the planned developments stressing one or two points in each category: 
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• Methodology: here the main developments can be categorized as improvements in the 
modelling process and the range of risk factors (especially operational and asset-
liability mismatch risks). 
• Parameters: no major field of future development; 2 participants intend to switch from 
a one-year to a multi-year risk assessment (this, of course, will heavily affect both the 
methodology and process side). 
• Tools: no major field of future development. 
• Processes: an important field for future development, concerning the IT infrastructure 
and the risk governance process.     
                           
   
BPV 
Guidelines for modelling fungibility of capital and the risk of sending parts of the group in 
run-off have to be developed. The market risk model will be expanded by additional risk 
factors. For companies with substantial risk in branches, global (high level) scenarios have to 
be formulated. The reserving risk quantification in P&C has to be improved and parameter 
risk has to be taken into account. The life model has to be expanded and stochastic risk has to 
be taken into account. The modelling of the group pension business has to be improved 
(replicating portfolio approach and guidelines for the prescribed minimal performance 
guarantee).  
Guidelines on corporate governance and risk management have to be formulated.  
 
BaFin 
The rules should be liberal enough so that internal models can evolve with markets and 
technology. 
 
IAA  
Amongst other considerations, it should be recognised that evolution of the modelling 
capabilities is to be encouraged. 
 
4.3 Major obstacles in development and use of internal models 
 
We give a short survey of the major obstacles in development and use of internal models, 
separately for the fields methodology, parameters, tools and processes as outlined in Section 
4.2 above. 
 
Methodology: 
• the misalignment of economic methodology and prescribed (regulatory) methods 
• model unable to reflect reality within a reasonable cost and time 
• sophisticated valuations under base and stressed scenarios  
 
Parameters:  
• calibration of asset return scenarios for smaller geographies 
 
Tools:            
• costs of developing or purchasing and implementing suitable information technology 
• current run-time issue ( ?  associated accuracy, limiting the number of simulations) 
• computer capacity   
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Processes:      
• complexity of the model (? increase of model risk) 
• human resources (education of the people involved) 
• management untrained on the meaning and uses of economic capital 
• inflexible structure, reluctant cooperation on the side of the sub-units 
• internal and external resources: quality and time 
• deficits in cooperation, responsibility, risk management skills 
• communication of results 
• coordination of input requirements 
• willingness and ability of the business units to cope with the volume of developmental 
work 
• keep methodological consistency between the business lines 
• consistent estimation around sub-units 
 
One major obstacle, perhaps the most decisive of all, is not mentioned yet, and it will be given 
extra room here: almost 90% of the participants stressed that DATA QUALITY, DATA 
RELIABILITY and DATA AVAILABILITY in connection with tough TIMELINES 
constitute one major obstacle when developing and using the integrated internal model.  
  
Data problems can be attributed to the parameter, tools, as well as to the processes section: 
• reliability of data  (e.g. lack of data) underlying estimation of correlation of assets, 
behaviour of policyholder, extreme event probabilities etc. (?  Parameters) 
• efficient storage and usage of company’s and external (data pools) data and 
automation of input data flows  (?  Tools) 
• data quality checks for errors, missing values, inconsistencies etc.  (?  Processes) 
• data availability according to tough timelines set by the company’s management       
(?   Processes) 
• data homogeneity from different databases all around the world  (?  Processes) 
 
Data questions may also affect the methodology section since the application of a statistical 
method is always subject to the availability of suitable data sets. 
 
The following picture shows the average obstacle-wise percentage weights that are given to 
each category, including the data issues as outlined above:  
 
                
areas of major obstacles
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From it we can deduce that although methodology could be identified as a main field of 
development for the integrated internal models (together with Processes, see 4.2), the main 
obstacles for development and use do not seem to lie on the methodology side. The maximum 
percentage number given to the methodology section was 33%, while on the other hand two 
participants mentioned no methodological problems at all. To the processes category, 4 
participants assigned 50% and more. The average percentage numbers for parameters and 
tools are higher than expected due to the attribution of data problems to these sections. 
[To conclude the statistical analysis: There is no significant difference between the means for 
parameters and tools. However, the methodology mean is significantly lower and the 
processes mean is significantly higher. The empirical standard deviations are 9.5, 16.9, 13.3 
and 14.2 for methodology, parameters, tools and processes, respectively.] 
 
We summarize: 
• The main obstacles seem to lie on the process side, as expected. One of the great 
problems here is connected to human resources (lack of cooperation, insight, skill and 
knowledge, source of errors and mismanagement). 
• Obstacles in methodology seem to be less important, e.g. quantification problems of 
special risk factors (credit risk, operational risk) were not mentioned at all here (this 
might be different within smaller companies). 
• Data problems (getting data organized, timely handling and validation of input data 
and data storage, etc.) seem to constitute the main overall obstacles (if “Data” were a 
separate category it would be weighted with about 40% as was mentioned by some of 
the participants).  
 
 
BPV 
For small companies the data used and know-how will be a problem and actuarial knowledge 
needs to be built up. Some companies might struggle with the quantification of market and 
especially credit risk.  
 
BaFin 
The success of the regulatory use of internal models will primarily hinge on whether the 
incentives are sufficient to make the deal “more information in exchange for lower capital 
requirements” work. 
  
4.4 Flexibility of internal models towards Solvency II 
 
An internal model, to gain approval by the regulators and market participants, must offer a 
high degree of adaptiveness to new products, new risks and market changes. We recommend 
that a clear process is defined for approval of model changes. 
 
Our observations made it apparent that the main difficulty for a model adjustment comes from 
the process side. Changing the technical and process implementation of the model might be a 
huge and material task, since many sub-units are involved. Large expenses may already be 
triggered by an increase of the frequency of calculation from once to twice a year, as has been 
mentioned by a participant. Also, some of the current tools in use show limited flexibility. 
 
Methodology and parameters seem to be comparatively easy adoptable, if necessary. In fact, 
several participants already have had internal discussions and assessments of alternative 
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methodological approaches, such as TailVaR vs. VaR, multi-year vs. one-year risk 
measurements, etc. However, 
• significant additional developments might be required if the basic construct of 
Solvency II diverges in a material way from the accounting changes (IFRS and EEV) 
and the local regulatory changes. 
• it would be the wrong way – in our opinion – to strictly require a one-year risk 
assessment throughout by Solvency II guidelines. Some participants have currently 
implemented (or plan to implement) a multi-year model. 
• a fundamental choice has been made by some participants to take the covariance 
method to determine the economic capital needed. This means that the entire group 
and its sub-units are not currently modelled on a full stochastic basis. 
 
We observed a trade-off between flexibility towards developments and adjustments to future 
requirements and “user friendliness” with which the tools can be used. In that regard, we 
clearly recommend that flexibility is favoured. 
 
It is understood that, in order to provide an incentive for large portions of the industry to 
move rather soon to advanced modelling techniques, the legislator may wish to allow models 
also to substitute parts of the (future) standard regulatory formulas.  
 
As for the latter and as at today, no EU standard regulatory approach is yet devised in any 
great detail. It has been mentioned to us, however, that the industry, overall - i.e. small, 
medium and large companies with local vs. international scope – seems to be agreed on the 
following principles for solvency assessment in the context of a Pillar 1 standard approach: 
 
• total-balance sheet approach 
• valuation of liabilities based on best estimate plus some explicit measure for risks and 
uncertainties (how, yet to be determined) 
• solvency capital determined based on a confidence level (at least) equal to investment 
grade over a one-year time horizon 
• preference for a set of covariance-based formulas, rather than for scenario and 
stochastic factor modelling 
• capital quantification of all major risk exposures, based on IAA-equivalent 
classification, with the two partial exceptions: operational and catastrophic risks, 
which would only be covered in Pillar 1 insofar as they lend themselves to reliable 
quantification EU wide (otherwise, candidates for Pillar 2 qualitative assessment) 
• conservative levels of diversification between liability classes, asset classes, assets and 
liabilities, geographical and sectoral basis.   
 
In view of these premises it seems likely that a modular approach would have to aggregate 
single risk numbers, which requires changes in the methodology of those participants whose 
current approach aggregates cash flows and probability distributions. This could encourage 
the intention for their internal models to replace any standard regulatory formulas entirely.  
 
We recommend that any model is kept flexible enough to assess separate risk types, business 
lines and legal entities individually. Essentially all participants mentioned their confidence in 
their internal models to be modular and flexible – with varying level of detail – in this regard. 
On the other hand, at least 3 participants revealed their intention for their internal models to 
replace the future regulatory standard approach entirely. 
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It is desirable that internal models which are compatible with the legal entity structure could 
be used to substitute for the solo Pillar 1 capital requirements in local jurisdictions where 
available.  
 
 
BPV 
The SST is modular and should be adaptable to be Solvency II compatible. The risk measure 
can be changed since the SST is distribution based. However, the SST does not quantify 
operational risk which might need to be included to be Solvency II compliant.  
 
BaFin 
We envision liberal standards for internal models, such that only minor modifications or 
additions are necessary to use existing models also for regulatory purposes. 
 
There has been an extended discussion about partial models in the CEIOPS non-life working 
group that cannot be repeated here. The main point is to strike a balance between too liberal 
and too restrictive partial use. On the one hand “partial use” should be allowed, possibly only 
temporarily, to ease transition from the standard method to the internal model or to treat 
special cases like mergers. On the other hand, cherry picking and minor tinkering on the 
standard method should be avoided. A general approach is to view the mixture of standard 
and internal model as a whole and attach essentially the same statistical quality criteria to this 
mixture model as to a full internal model.         
 
4.5 Proposals for admissibility of internal models  
 
The IAA WP report comprises a discussion on the regulatory validation and approval of 
internal models (Section 7.4). The report mentions three instances where internal models have 
been adopted for required capital calculations: Basel I (market risks), the Canadian life, and 
the Australian non-life regulation.  
 
Out of those instances the IAA extracts some essential minimum requirements for the 
admissibility of internal models in respect of prudence, comparability and consistency within 
a supervisor’s jurisdiction (the following five paragraphs are from the IAA WP report): 
 
Prudential Requirements: The insurer must demonstrate that the internal model operates 
within a risk management environment that is conceptually sound and supported by adequate 
resources. It also needs to be supported by appropriate audit and compliance procedures. A 
number of qualitative criteria follow from these minimum requirements: 
• The insurer should have an independent internal risk management unit, responsible for 
the design and implementation of the risk-based capital model. 
• The insurer’s Board and senior management should be actively involved in the risk 
control process, which should be demonstrated as a key aspect of business 
management. 
• The model should be closely integrated with the day-to-day management processes of 
the insurer. 
• An independent review of the model should be carried out on a regular basis. 
(Amongst other considerations, it should be recognised that evolution of the modelling 
capabilities is to be encouraged) 
• Operational risks should be considered. 
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Comparability and Consistency Requirements: The model’s output needs to fit closely with 
the supervisor’s view of key minimum performance criteria, such as probability of default and 
other important measures of financial soundness. Quantitative criteria relating to these needs 
could include: 
• A requirement for the model to calculate the capital needed to keep the annual 
probability of default below a certain level (or levels) 
• An ability for calculating the likely spread of economic costs relating to a range of 
potential outcomes for the business, etc. 
 
In addition the model should include the capability for specification of the key risk factors for 
general insurance business. These would include factors relating to both assets and liabilities 
including: 
• Measurement of cash flows for both assets and liabilities 
• The risk of changes in outstanding claims valuation due to changes in economic, 
environmental or experience-related factors 
• The risk of changes to the adequacy of premium rates due to changes in economic, 
competitive or environmental factors 
• Catastrophe concentration risk 
• Expense risk 
• The reinsurance security risk and risk of reinsurance cost variability 
 
The model should include a facility to enable comparability of correlation effects between risk 
classes as well as a system of stress testing and other scenario-based examinations. 
 
The model should be in a format to allow a reasonably straightforward detailed review by 
appropriately skilled representatives of the supervisor to enable a relatively “painless” 
approval procedure.  
 
From our survey we now extract some additional aspects which could serve as further 
minimum European Solvency II standards for admissibility of internal models and may lead 
to practical yet prudent approval criteria that can effectively be applied by the regulators. 
 
• True embedding of the internal model in the management process, i.e. capital 
allocation, performance management and pricing, etc. (the model may and must serve 
many masters, not just one). This will be the best available review process as the 
management will be concerned about the relative fairness of model. This, however, 
may require the new regime to allow for reflection of management structures rather 
than legal structures, especially by focusing on the group-level rather than the legal-
entity level. Subsidiaries should accordingly get regulatory relief if appropriate 
parental support is in place. 
• The internal model is subject to yearly renewals. Changes that lead to material capital 
changes have to be reported to regulators. Rules based criteria cannot capture this 
dynamic aspect of internal models. Principles based requirements are therefore 
needed: the regulator should set the broad objectives and framework of an internal 
model, leaving the detailed guidelines to be set and disclosed by the company. 
• Framework should be based on economic, realistic and risk based assessment of assets 
and liabilities and risk exposures. 
• History of the model: how, by whom and when has it been developed and 
implemented. 
• Public disclosure of all relevant internal model methodology and assumptions.  
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• A standard model, reflecting the Solvency II principles, shall exist for insurance 
companies not maintaining an own internal model. This standard model shall be 
conservative to provide a benchmark and incentive to use internal model. 
• Supporting documentation to include: asset model, frequency and severity models, 
impact of reinsurance, impact of diversification, etc. Clear exposure as to where the 
internal model deviates from the regulatory standard model.  
• Minimum list of business and risks to be identified and assessed (e.g. to avoid cherry 
picking of low capital business units). 
• Minimum standards for  
o calibration (comparing market value against model value for a basket of 
different aspects) 
o parameter selection, with a particular focus on correlations 
o stress testing 
o diversification benefits (including fungibility) 
• Unnecessary complexity versus effectiveness (e.g. whether the selected modelling 
points/number of scenarios are sufficient to have a reasonable representation of the 
risk profile of the business). 
• Cost-benefit assessment (whether the running times, staff, processes involved and data 
requirements are reasonable in terms of costs). There has to be business sense in the 
regulatory requirements.  
• Flexibility to allow for changes in variables, modelling and output, and flexibility in 
analysis (i.e. modular structure, user-friendly platform, add-in spreadsheet tools, etc.). 
• Many of the admissibility criteria applied to internal capital models in the banking 
sector are appropriate for the insurance sector. However, the key differences between 
banking and insurance models need to be understood and reflected in revised 
admissibility criteria for insurance models. An example: Banking models are typically 
based on just one part of the business model – for example the market trading book or 
the credit risk portfolio – and projections are made for relatively short periods of time 
(days or weeks); substantial blocks of actual and modelled outcomes can be built over 
relatively short time periods to validate or “back test” models. In the insurance sector 
models cover long time periods and are whole enterprise models – there is unlikely to 
be ever sufficient data to allow fully credible “back testing” and alternative 
approaches must be taken to validation. This requires  
o an extensive testing and validation of input assumptions – through back testing 
where feasible 
o external reviews and benchmarking 
o a detailed analysis and testing of modelled scenarios focusing on both mean 
scenarios and individual extreme scenarios 
• The internal model should be more than just stressing the balance sheet. New business 
must not jeopardize the sufficiency of current assets. 
• Clear definition of what different time horizons mean. For multi-year risk assessment 
it has to be found out where the residual risk of the run-off becomes small enough. 
• Separate treatment of life and non-life business. 
 
It can be expected that there will be migration over time of the models towards internationally 
best practices, and a gradual back feeding of modelling experience into the regulatory 
standard approach. 
 
There is the desire that groups should be allowed to focus on capital adequacy at group level. 
There should be a main regulator co-ordinating with other regulatory bodies.  
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Moreover, it has been mentioned that new solvency requirements must on average not lead to 
rising capital requirements for the insurance industry. 
 
BPV  
There needs to be transparency and an open risk culture within the company so that the 
internal model is continually discussed within the company. 
The methodology of the internal model has to be disclosed publicly (e.g. in the form of a 
seminar etc.) in sufficient detail such that there can be an informed public (academic) 
discussion about the underlying framework. 
There needs to be documentation of the model on different levels (for the actuaries within the 
company having to deal with model on a day-to-day basis, for the CRO, for the CEO.) 
 
BaFin 
BaFin’s current working standard consists of the “BaFin White Paper on Internal Models – 
Key Issues” and the “Basic Principles for the Use of Internal Risk Models in Insurance 
Companies for the Improvement of Financial Supervision”, Suggestion from the German 
Insurance Association, 12.12.2001. These will likely be developed further in the upcoming 
discussions between BaFin and GDV.   
 29
 5 Glossary 
 
An important step towards comparing the internal models is to lay down a glossary and a 
common formal setup. We are well aware of the different accounting systems and the 
complexity inherent in determining the capital structure. However, as a smallest common 
denominator for current economic capital adequacy purposes we shall propose the following 
terminology underlying the following simplistic framework. We are focussing on 
methodological aspects here. 
 
The basis of insurance business is setting up the available risk capital as difference of the 
values of assets and liabilities, i.e. 
  
                           AC   =   value of assets   -   value of liabilities. 
 
Now, the main methodological differences concern 
• Capital adequacy 
• Valuation of assets and liabilities 
• Risk modelling and measurement. 
 
Capital adequacy is about the viewpoint taken when determining the AC. It can be 
distinguished between a 
• Solvency point of view: economic, regulatory, rating agency 
• Level point of view: group vs. sub-unit 
• Capital point of view: policyholder vs. shareholder 
 
Valuation of assets and liabilities is about market consistency (market consistent valuation vs. 
statutory valuation). In this report market consistent valuation of liabilities (e.g. by best 
estimate) is to be understood as a synonym for economic valuation. 
 
Default (insolvency) of the company happens when AC becomes negative. Risk modelling 
and measurement is about calculating (from the AC) the capital necessary to prevent default 
with a certain level of confidence. The methodologies comprise 
o scenario based models 
o static factor models 
o covariance models 
o stochastic factor models. 
 
Other aspects are: time horizon (also important for the valuation, as the AC is time 
dependent), the applied risk measures (e.g. VaR, TailVaR) and the aggregation method 
(diversification effects and fungibility issues). 
 
In the following we list up the terminology used in this framework, referring to the separate 
sections for a more detailed discussion. 
 
Assets:  Include cash, bonds (government, corporate), loans, mortgages, equity, real estate, 
investment funds: equity, real estate, bond funds, and others. 
(Sect. 7.1) 
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Liabilities:  Anything that gives rise to cash flows on the insurance side (life, non-life, health; 
the granularity can range from a single insurance policy to an entire book of insurance 
business). Pension schemes or some form of debt might be excluded. 
(Sect. 7.1) 
Available Risk Capital (AC):  Essentially the difference between the value of the assets and 
the value of the liabilities. In practice there are different turnouts for AC depending on the 
view on capital adequacy or the notion of “value”, respectively. Synonyms in use: available 
capital, available economic capital, risk-bearing capital, fair value.                          
                   (Sect. 6.2) 
Total Balance Sheet Requirement (TBSR):  Total capital (in form of assets) the company 
has to hold in order to meet solvency requirements with a certain level of  confidence. 
(Sect. 6.4) 
Required Risk Capital (RC):  Capital that the company judges it requires in addition to 
today’s value of the liabilities in order to meet solvency requirements with a certain level of  
confidence; in this approach the RC is the difference between the TBSR and the value of the 
liabilities including possibly a risk margin. Synonyms in use: economic capital, risk based capital, 
required economic capital, economic risk capital 
(Sect. 6.4) 
Best Estimate (BE):  Expectation of discounted future cash flows with policyholder 
behaviour, embedded options and guarantees taken into account. 
(Sect. 7.3.1) 
Risk Margin:  The risk margin as add on to the best estimate (or as part of the RC) is 
reflecting prudence concerning future capital costs in a market consistent way, e.g. (by SST 
definition) covering the hypothetical cost of regulatory capital necessary to run-off all the 
insurance liabilities, following financial distress of the company.     
(Sect. 7.3.2) 
Backing Assets:  Assets which are supporting the liabilities. 
(Sect. 10) 
Free Assets:  Assets which are not supporting the liabilities. 
(Sect. 10) 
Solvency Point of View:   Including or not including regulatory or rating agencies’ 
requirements and viewpoints into the definition of AC.  
(Sect. 6.2) 
Level Point of View:  Group solvency vs. sub-unit solvency. May include transferability 
restrictions between sub-units and group in determining the (group) AC. 
(Sect. 6.2) 
Capital Point of View:  Taking policyholder or shareholder viewpoint in the definition of AC 
and RC. 
(Sect. 6.2) 
Scenario Based Model:  Risk capital calculation is based on measuring the impact of 
(company) specific scenarios to the total P&L distribution. 
(Sect. 8.2) 
Static Factor Model:  Risk capital calculation is based on a linear combination of static 
factors (“risk weights”) multiplied with company specific size measures with no stochastic 
cash flow modelling.  
(Sect. 8.2) 
Covariance Model: Risk capital calculation is based on an aggregation of single risk numbers 
by simple sum or square root formulae. 
(Sect. 8.2) 
Stochastic Factor Model: Risk capital calculation is based on an aggregated P&L 
distribution. 
(Sect. 8.2) 
Value at Risk (VaR):  Quantile of a distribution (e.g. P&L distribution). 
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(Sect. 10) 
Tail Value at Risk (TailVaR):  Conditional expectation, conditioned on the tail of the 
distribution (e.g. P&L distribution). Synonym in use: expected shortfall. 
(Sect. 10) 
Diversification:  Compensatory effect (stochastic or deterministic) on aggregation of capital 
reducing the capital needs in comparison to standalone measurement. It is stemming from the 
assumption of having not fully dependence between the objects (risk types, sub-units), or by 
opposite portfolio sensitivities on the risk factors. 
(Sect. 9) 
Fungibility:  Unrestricted flow of capital between sub-units (or between group and sub-units) 
in case of financial distress. Fungibility is the justification for the application of 
diversification. 
(Sect. 9.2) 
Market consistent Value of an asset:  The observed market price, or marked to model. 
 
Market consistent Value of a liability:  Amount an arm’s length transaction in a liquid 
market would require the transferring insurer to pay the party taking over the liability. Here 
the best estimate plus a risk margin if no such market is available.  
 
Economic Value of a liability:   The present value (allowing for time and risk) of all future 
cash-flows (The Institute of Actuaries of Australia, GN 552). Economic value is the same as 
market value when the financial instrument in question is tradable in an active, frictionless 
market; else there may be factors like recent transaction benchmarks, political and economic 
events, etc. affecting the market value that are not necessarily encompassed within an 
economic valuation process. 
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 6 Capital adequacy 
 
The objective of any capital adequacy model is to find a portfolio structure that asserts the 
continuation of the existing business up to a given time horizon where assets and liabilities are 
assumed being capitalized.  
 
Essentially all participants agree that the economic view of the world provides the most 
accurate picture of the risk profile and capital adequacy. However, it is also recognised that in 
a realistic model there are regulatory and rating agency constraints to be met. Moreover, as an 
interim measure, liabilities are sometimes estimated from their statutory values. E.g. some 
participants are estimating economic life liabilities from European Embedded Value models. 
At least 4 participants mention explicitly to base their capital calculations on a mixture of 
economic and statutory principles. E.g. cash flows considered are driven by each unit’s 
statutory (regulatory) constraints.  
 
We recommend that for a realistic view of the world, regulatory constraints are taken into 
account, and statutory values may serve as interim variables if needed (see e.g. fungibility, 
Section 9.2). 
 
We have been asked to pay attention to currency aspects. Based on our observations we 
recommend that currency risk is divided into structural (or functional) and translation 
currency risk (see Section 8.1.1 Market Risks). Functional currency risk may have a material 
effect on capital adequacy if the currency matching is low. The translation currency risk 
matters to the extent that capital is assumed to be fungible between sub-units. We recommend 
that translation currency risk is further studied in relation to group capital fungibility issues.  
 
We recommend that for comparability of the capital adequacy between the companies, more 
consistency between their internal methodologies and concepts is achieved. At the moment, 
there are still considerable differences, which is due to the different accounting systems and 
the complexity inherent in determining the capital structure. This study attempts to classify 
these discrepancies. However, we recommend that further effort is done towards convergence 
of the various methodologies.  
 
6.1 Risk tolerance 
 
For all participants, the overall risk tolerance is reflected in the confidence level underlying 
the risk measurement. The risk tolerance may be linked to the group’s rating ambitions. 
However, it is usually not measured using rating agencies’ models. Rather, the probability of 
default, which is an internal concept, is calibrated to meet the rating agencies’ default 
probabilities of target rated bonds.  
 
The resulting capital requirements depend on the initial composition of the portfolio. The 
group may take out “free assets” from the assessment. This can nominally result in lower 
capital requirements. As a consequence, stand alone required capital figures are not 
comparable across companies if not reported relative to the backing up available capital. 
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6.2 Available risk capital  
 
Synonyms in use: available economic capital, risk-bearing capital, fair value (not IFRS). 
 
Throughout, the available risk capital is formally defined as difference between the value of 
assets and liabilities. In practice this depends amongst others on the following points of view: 
 
Solvency point of view: 
• Economic (market-consistent) view: There is no concept of core and secondary 
capital. Available risk capital is the market consistent value of assets minus liabilities. 
Values are in principle fully fungible. 
• Regulatory view: Tiered capital counts. Hybrid Tier 1 type instruments are included as 
available risk capital. 
• Rating agency view: Here the rules of e.g. S&P or Moody’s apply. Subordinated debt 
may qualify as hybrid capital included as available capital. 
o 10 participants take an economic point of view for their solvency assessment. 
o 3 participants do not solely take an economic point of view. This can be as 
proxy for economic modelling for some business units. However, it has been 
mentioned that the ultimate aim is to get both the regulators and rating 
agencies to accept the capital based on economic internal models as the 
“correct view of the world”. 
 
Level point of view: group vs. sub-unit. Some participants (at least 2) take account of 
transferability restrictions between sub-units and group to determine the group available 
capital. This implies a non pure economic concept of value at group level. Pure economic 
values are fully fungible. We recommend that this aspect is further studied in connection with 
the fungibility/diversification issue. 
 
Capital point of view: policyholder versus shareholder. It can be expected that the 
regulators will require the policyholder point of view for admissibility of the internal model. 
From a draft solvency II directive (MARKT/2507/05: Article N1: Objective of supervision): 
“The main objective of supervision is to act for the protection of policyholders.” 
• From the policyholder point of view, the insurance cash flows should be asserted and 
hence discounted by the prevailing risk-free rates. If more appropriate, e.g. for the 
sake of data reliability, the risk-free rates are approximated by the swap rates. 
Moreover, intangibles, such as deferred tax assets and liabilities, are not necessarily on 
the balance sheet. 
• From the shareholder point of view, the insurance cash flows are discounted with the 
prevailing target rating risk-adjusted rates (e.g. AA swap rates plus some company 
specific spread, to account for implicit default options) plus appropriate adjustments, 
e.g. for netting of the costs inherent in insurance cash flows. Deferred tax assets and 
liabilities become material and are taken into account. 
o 2 participants use shareholder point of view.                                                                               
o 11 participants use policyholder point of view 
 
The available risk capital further depends on: 
• The selection of assets that are considered for bearing risk (e.g. the “backing assets“, 
as opposed to the “free assets”). 
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• The underlying accounting system, which is the basic input which is then 
economically modified for the valuation, throughout. These modifications, however, 
remained opaque during this study. 
• The liabilities that are considered for protection. This may include subordinated debt, 
but in most cases it does not, which is tantamount to saying that subordinated debt is 
part of risk-bearing available capital.  
o 3 participants do not count subordinated debt as available capital. It is either 
off-balance sheet or treated as liability (one case only), see ACI in the figure 
below. 
o 10 participants count subordinated debt as risk bearing available capital, as far 
as admissible by regulators, see ACII on the figure below. 
? 3 of them only at group level. Sub-units do not issue subordinated debt. 
? 3 of them capture interest payments on subordinated debt as a (group-
level) expense 
• The value that is assigned to these liabilities. Main factor: does this value include an 
explicit or implicit risk margin or not. See Section 7.3 “Liability valuation principles”. 
• The assessment of ring-fenced funds, e.g. participating funds, to reflect the non-
fungibility of capital from these funds. We recommend that participating funds are 
valued in terms of the guaranteed participation considered as a liability, to achieve a 
consistent assessment within an economic context.  
 
An alternative would be to treat subordinated debt as a liability on a full economic basis, i.e. 
as a short position in a defaultable bond. Consequently, its value drops in case of financial 
distress of the company. The effect on the economic balance sheet is that both available and 
required risk capital are reduced. This is essentially equivalent to including subordinated debt 
as available capital.  
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DNB    
Determining actual available capital 
In determining solvency, capital that does not serve to cover foreseeable liabilities is a 
residual item (surplus). The amount of this can be derived from the difference between the 
realistic value of freely disposable assets and the realistic value of total foreseeable liabilities. 
 
If financing instruments consist entirely or partly of elements of a foreseeable liability 
(contractual or moral), these parts have to be valued as a liability in line with the realistic 
value principles, allowing for the creditworthiness of the institution. This generally applies for 
all liabilities other than those under pension or insurance contracts. 
 
BPV 
Market value of assets – best estimate of liabilities (where best-estimate means risk-free 
discounted expected cash flows) + valuation of all relevant options and guarantees. Some 
assets are not accepted for SST purposes (e.g. goodwill). 
 
6.3 Solvency and default  
 
The definition of group solvency is a complex issue. In realistic terms it may depend on 
transferability constraints of capital from sub-units to others. Capital transfers occur if sub-
units have capital in excess of their own local solvency requirements, capital injections are 
necessary in order to prevent sub-unit’s default according to local solvency requirements. The 
definition of solvency can and does have an impact on the capital requirements.  
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The definitions are as various as the business and legal structures of the participating groups. 
e can classify our observations as follows: 
ency on an economic value basis. Some take 
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 solvency requirements. E.g. if a sub-unit has its own rating.  
 
In all mode  ( al 
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NB    
olvency is assessed at the level of the licensed entity. For solvency calculation purposes, 
s the situation in which the surplus – as defined above – is less than zero. 
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lly, this is not default but regulatory action will be taken). SST requirement (= risk 
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.4 Required risk capital 
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tively defined capital requirement serves several purposes: 
• Provides a rainy day fund, so when bad things happen, there is money to cover them 
e extent 
l requirements are a function of actual economic risk 
• 
other 
 
The IA  as what the company judges it requires for ongoing 
perations and what it must hold in order to gain the necessary confidence of the marketplace, 
o be 
W
• Group solvency: 
o 9 participants define group solv
fungibility
o 4 participants define group solvency on a statutory basis. This involves a 
classification of capital by tiers.  
-unit solvency: 
4 participants mention that their d
reflects local
ls 13 participants), default of sub-units does not play a role for the group capit
a
options on sub-units are not valued. Possibly different target rating requirements for group 
and sub-units are based on the diversification effects on group level. Credit risk (shareholder
point of view) is exclusively taken into account at group level, if at all. 
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default i
 
BPV 
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(actua
bearing capital exceeds target capital) is not a solvency requirement but a pillar 2 requireme
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Synonyms in use:  economic capital
c
 
According to the IAA, an effec
• Motivates a company to avoid undesirable levels of risk (from a policyholder 
perspective) 
• Promotes a risk measurement and management culture within a company, to th
that the capita
• Provides a tool for supervisors to assume control of a failed or failing company 
Alerts supervisors to emerging trends in the market 
• Ensures that the insurance portfolio of a troubled insurer can be transferred to an
carrier with high certainty 
A defines economic capital
o
its policyholders, its investors and its supervisors. Economic capital can be considered t
the minimum amount of equity or investment to be maintained in the company by its owners 
(shareholders) to ensure the ongoing operation of the company. Since a company’s net 
income is often measured as a rate of return on investor equity, many companies are 
 37
motivated to maintain actual capital as close as possible to economic capital in order to 
maximize return on equity. 
 
This is in general different from the target regulatory capital that a company is required by its 
upervisors to hold as a condition of being granted a licence or to continue to conduct the 
SR) is defined as the sum of the value of the 
abilities and the required risk capital. The IAA Working Party believes that solvency would 
ent 
 
nt of view. We observed 
at required risk capital on top of the insurance liability value is a target value for the current 
d 
 
he question is how one can achieve that there will be enough resources at the end of that 
over the realistic value of the technical provision of the remaining contracts? The 
ar.  
 
he required risk capital is the expected shortfall of change of risk bearing capital during one 
 
he output of the internal model is a probability distribution. The regulatory capital is 
w derived from that distribution. It is clear that the risk of a portfolio depends on the 
s
business of insurance in a jurisdiction. 
 
The total balance sheet requirement (TB
li
be best defined in terms of the TBSR. This approach allows capital adequacy assessm
relatively independent of the accounting system. One obtains the solvency capital requirement
as the difference between the TBSR and the liability requirements.  
 
The present study focuses on the internal group capital adequacy poi
th
portfolio to be able to avoid potential default or absorb potential losses within a given time 
horizon, measured with respect to a predetermined overall risk tolerance (confidence level). 
This may involve in particular a sound set of assumptions concerning future new business an
management actions. The objective is throughout based on the individual internal concept of
solvency. 
 
DNB    
T
year to c
answer is of course that the insurer will need to hold additional capital at the start of the ye
There needs to be a high degree of probability that after one year the realistic value of the 
technical provision of the remaining contracts will still be covered by the resources available 
at that time. The solvency surcharge is to be calculated in such a way that this degree of 
probability is achieved. The solvency on top of the realistic value of the technical provision is 
needed to make sure that the total level of assets after one year is higher than the realistic
value of the technical provision after one year (with a probability of 99,5%). 
 
BPV 
T
year. 
 
BaFin
T
someho
base currency. This will be EUR for Solvency II purposes. 
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 7 Valuation of assets and liabilities 
 
7.1 Considered assets and liabilities  
 
It is understood that those assets and liabilities are considered for capital adequacy puroposes 
which  
• are material from an economic point of view (policyholders’ or shareholders’) 
• are expected to give rise to cash flows  
• influence future cash flows from an economic point of view, 
independently of their balance sheet treatment. 
 
Assets and liabilities are split into classes such that risk factors and risk exposures relevant for 
the risk calculations are adequately captured. There is no clear trend regarding granularity: 
some companies assess insurance liabilities on an aggregate level (e.g. by guarantee level, line 
of business, out of embedded value runs, etc.), some consider policy levels (especially, for life 
insurance). 
 
Assets include cash, bonds (government, corporate), loans, mortgages, equity, real estate, 
investment funds: equity, real estate, bond funds, and others. 
 
Significant insurance subsidiaries should have their own internal capital model based on a 
consistent group-wide methodology, but implemented locally to ensure full embedding within 
the management of the business unit, and integration into the risk management framework. 
Small insurance subsidiaries are taken at net asset value. 
 
Strategic shares (shares held for strategic reasons) should be given a particular treatment due 
to concentration and illiquidity risk. 
 
Intangibles (such as deferred tax assets, deferred acquisition cost, goodwill) are in the 
majority of cases subtracted from the accounting balance sheet (i.e. are given zero economic 
value), except for a few participants (at least 3), in particular, those who take the 
shareholders’ point of view. 
 
The pension scheme liabilities/employee benefits are not yet fully considered in all models. 
Some participants allow for pension liabilities or subordinated debt at group level only. It is 
recommended that internal models should be able to take into account the full spectrum of 
liabilities.  
 
We recommend in line with the FTK consultation document (October 2004) that any 
institution must consider whether financing instruments will result in foreseeable liabilities. 
These are part of loan capital. Under the going concern assumption, a subordinated loan may 
be seen as a foreseeable liability if the issuer is morally or legally obliged to make payments 
to the holder of that loan. This obligation will lapse in the event of bankruptcy. 
 
This study does not enter a detailed discussion about expenses. The IAA Working Party 
recommends that solvency assessment of insurers should also consider the risks involved with 
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the expenses of a company. Henceforth we suppose that any cost be implicit part of the 
liabilities.  
 
7.2 Asset valuation principles 
Throughout the companies, assets are valued on a market consistent basis. That is, assets are 
marked to market if a market value is available and otherwise marked to model (e.g. using an 
arbitrage-free multi-currency economic scenario generator, such as Barrie and Hibbert).  
 
Foreign exchange risk is supposed to be an integral part of the risk assessment for all methods 
used. However, it is not always fully taken into account yet. 
 
Future prices of assets and liabilities are modelled with and without drift. Clearly, the latter is 
a more prudent approach. Statistical estimation of a drift is known not to be reliable on 
specific (short term) time horizons. See e.g. Embrechts, P., Kaufmann, R., Patie, P.: Strategic 
long-term financial risks: single risk factors (ETH Working paper, 2004). 
 
7.3 Liability valuation principles 
 
There is currently no industry standard for liability valuation. We observed the following 
basic approaches: 
 
• 5 participants define the value of insurance liabilities as best estimate, letting the 
(implicit) risk margin be part of the required capital (V2). 
• 4 participants compute and add an explicit risk margin to the best estimate for the 
value of insurance liabilities (V3). 
• For 3 participants their models are (partially) based on statutory values (V1); for 
example, as a proxy for economic values for some business units. As a side effect, this 
takes into account “realistic fungibility” of capital, any statutory solvency 
requirements and valuation rules. 
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It was also mentioned that, in a multi-year model, if no intermediate balance sheets are 
needed, the initial liabilities may be valued by assessing the initial amount of assets required 
to cover in full the claims and expenses over the entire run-off. 
 
As for market consistency of liability valuation, we got the following answers: 
• 9 participants use or are aiming at (by e.g. approximations)  market consistent 
valuation 
• 3 participants use different concepts: (mixture of) regulatory/statutory demands. These 
participants coincide with the above 3 with (V1).  
 
Stochastic simulation models introduce technical difficulties when applying nested “stochastic 
within stochastic” valuations at each point in time. Some participants have agreed with the 
local regulator upon simplified, approximate gross up factor approaches to long term liability 
valuation.  Here we recommend the adaptation of the method by F.A. Longstaff and E.S. 
Schwartz (UCLA): Valuing American Options by Simulation: A Simple Least-Squares 
Approach, Review of Financial Studies vol. 14 (2001). The idea of the method is to 
approximate the conditional continuation values with linear regression. 
 
A possible realistic approach towards statutory intermediate solvency assessment is to apply 
the respective regulatory demands. This partly captures the current fungibility of capital at 
group level. Note that the surrender value of life insurance liabilities may be higher than a 
market consistent value.  
 
Mostly, cash flows are (intended to be) modelled net of reinsurance. If reinsurance programs 
are dealt with at group level, then local cash flows are taken gross of reinsurance, and 
reinsurance is taken into account on an aggregate level, e.g. as an asset which is subject to 
default risk. 
 
 
DNB 
The insurance undertaking should determine the expected value (of each component), i.e. a 
central estimate, of the technical provision for each individual homogeneous risk group. In 
order to cover unavoidable risks and uncertainties inherent in the insurance liabilities, the 
realistic value of the insurance liabilities should contain a 'central estimate' as well as a 
suitable risk margin. The risk margin, added to this central estimate, is set in such a way that it 
complies with a target level of prudence (V3). 
 
BPV 
The value of liabilities is given as market consistent best estimate (V2). 
 
BaFin 
Valuation should approximate a “fair market value”, which includes an appropriate valuation 
margin. Mark to market where possible; mark to model otherwise. 
 
7.3.1 Best estimate 
 
For the majority of the participants the best estimate is based on 
• Expectation of discounted cash flows 
• Policyholder behaviour taken into account as realistically as possible 
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• Embedded options and guarantees taken into account 
• Discounted by risk-free (policyholder point of view) or risk- and cost-adjusted 
(shareholder point of view) yield curve 
 
The degree of application of the above principles varies within the groups by lines of 
business. A few participants follow explicitly a different approach, such as 
 
• The present value (discounted by the realized rates of the asset fund) of the cash flows 
emerging in a best estimate scenario  
• Expected nominal ultimate claim size for non-life business 
 
We recommend that the best estimate of the insurance liabilities comprises any market 
consistent value with no explicit margin for insurance technical risk (such as mortality level 
risk). This may, for instance, be approached by a replicating portfolio, modelling all 
policyholder liabilities and interactions with the financial markets on a stochastic basis and 
using discounting methods (deflators) and/or scenarios (risk-neutral) which ensure market 
consistency. Market consistency would require to taking into account policyholder 
participation and all embedded options and guarantees subject to market risk. A risk margin, 
reflecting prudence in a market consistent way, may be added on top of the best estimate. 
 
 
DNB  
See comments at the beginning of Section 7.3. 
 
BPV 
The best estimate is the discounted cash flow + valuation of options and guarantees 
 
BaFin 
Expectation under the statistically estimated probability measure. 
 
7.3.2 Risk margin 
 
We observed the following definitions of the explicit risk margin: 
 
• present value of expected future capital costs (this may include risk capital cost, 
regulatory capital cost, and tax capital cost), or 
• based on a quantile (75% to 90%) of the P&L distribution. This can be defined as the 
outcome of particular regulatory-predetermined scenarios (market, credit and 
insurance risk). 
 
Both approaches are equally often used by the participants. 
 
We recommend that the risk margin is an add-on to the best estimate, which is to be 
distinguished from any additional solvency capital required for e.g. a target rating. This 
margin should reflect prudence explicitly in a market consistent way. It could consist of future 
risk and/or regulatory and/or tax capital cost. We do not recommend that the risk margin is 
defined as a quantile of some loss distribution without linking it to an economic argument. 
 
The sum of best estimate and risk margin could for instance be linked to the IASB “entity-
specific value” or “fair value” concept. 
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DNB 
Until some theoretical and practical issues regarding the market value margin will be resolved 
– no markets exist in which transparent price setting occurs in relation to the transfer of 
liabilities between institutions; a situation of imperfect information and information 
asymmetry exists; in addition, sufficient market data have not been available for all sectors 
and branches for a model-based valuation of insurance liabilities – the insurance undertaking 
could approximate this margin for unavoidable risks using the 75% confidence level. This 
confidence level regards the probability distribution of the present value of all cash flows 
arising from the insurance contracts during the lifetime of the insurance contracts. 
 
BPV 
Cost of capital for the present value of future target capital necessary for the run-off of the 
portfolio, where one can assume that the assets are moved to an optimal replicating portfolio 
taking into account liquidity constrains 
 
BaFin  
The value of insurance liabilities may be composed of best estimate and explicit risk margin, 
if “derivative-like” valuation under the risk-neutral measure is not possible for the specific 
asset or liability. Risk margin is defined as some estimate of the risk premium, which will be 
related to the non-diversifiable part of the risk of the asset. 
 
7.3.3 Discounting of future cash values  
 
As for the discounting of future cash values for the valuation of assets and liabilities, 
 
• 5 participants discount insurance cash flows by the currency specific risk-free rates. 
This contains the replicating portfolio valuation method in particular.  
• 5 participants use (AA) swap rates instead. This is either to i) approximate the risk-
free rates by more reliable swap rates (5 participants), and/or ii) to express the option 
to default on the insurance liabilities (shareholder’s point of view) (1 participant) 
• 3 participants use different discounting factors, such as statutory reserving rates, 
returns of invested assets or risk- and cost-adjusted rates (shareholder point of view). 
 
For the market consistent bond valuation on the asset side, the rating’s appropriate discount 
rates are used.  
 
DNB 
An institution’s insurance liabilities are valued by discounting the associated cash flows using 
a term structure of interest rates which has to be based on the zero coupon yields on default-
free capital market instruments. The expected value of pension and insurance liabilities can be 
estimated in this way if their realistic value cannot be observed directly in the market. 
 
The creditworthiness of the supervised institution and the yields on the underlying 
investments, therefore, has no effect on the valuation of the liabilities. This relationship only 
has to be reflected in the valuation if the contractual terms of the liabilities have a direct link 
with specific investments of the institution, such as unit-linked insurance where the institution 
does not bear the investment risk. 
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DNB intends to publish a nominal term structure of interest rates for discounting pension and 
insurance liabilities denominated in euros to be used to determine the realistic value of the 
expected cash flows. For this, DNB intends: 
- to use information from the market for interest rate products (including interbank 
swaps) in deriving the term structure of interest rates; 
- to estimate the term structure of interest rates frequently, using the above 
methodology, and to publish the results. 
 
Discounting approximation method 
Various responses to the Solvency Test White Paper expressed a concern that it would be 
difficult for smaller institutions in particular to meet the terms of the FTK. A valuation 
method is, therefore, proposed for pension and insurance liabilities which approximates the 
valuation of explicit cash flows using the term structure of interest rates. 
 
Under this approach, the present value of pension and insurance liabilities is calculated from 
the present actuarial/administrative valuation techniques in the institution’s records using the 
most suitable discount rate. The institution must first estimate the maturity characteristics of 
the underlying liabilities at each reporting date. It has to obtain the interest rate appropriate to 
this maturity from the term structure of interest rates prescribed by DNB. The institution can 
estimate the expected value of the insurance portfolio using this interest rate. The advantage 
of this is that this method is in line with the institution’s probable actual 
actuarial/administrative techniques.  
 
Despite the disadvantage that there can be significant differences between the valuation of 
cash flows under the term structure of interest rates and valuation using the approximation 
method, this approach may remain an option for a few years for smaller institutions in 
particular, provided certain conditions are met: 
- There needs to be a valuation for each homogenous risk group; 
- The value thus established must have an additional surcharge because of possible 
shortfalls compared with the expected value of the liabilities based on the term 
structure of interest rates. DNB will set this margin at least once a year. The amount of 
the margin will be derived in part from the curve of the term structure of interest rates 
at year end. This surcharge will also encourage institutions to make the effort to 
establish the realistic value based on the term structure of interest rates. 
 
BPV 
The discount factor is the risk-free rate.   
 
BaFin 
We expect the EUR swap curve to be used as the benchmark curve in discounting. Swap rates 
are available up to 50 years time to maturity in Bloomberg. 
 
7.3.4 Embedded options and guarantees 
 
To the question whether embedded options and guarantees are taken into account for the 
valuation of insurance liabilities, 9 participants answered with a straight “yes”. That is, they 
use market consistent methods for the valuation of embedded options and guarantees, such as 
risk-neutral Monte Carlo simulations of future cash flows. Moreover, 
• 11 participants take policyholder behaviour into account 
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• 8 participants take management actions (e.g. bonus cutting) into account (partially 
only approximately or in parts of the business). 
 
Exceptions/special cases are due to  
• Embedded options in non-life (e.g. special termination or extended discovery clauses) 
are claimed to be non material and difficult to model, and are neglected 
• The European Embedded Value project is sometimes used as basis for valuing 
embedded options. However, embedded value has a limited ability to capture 
embedded options adequately (e.g. deterministic assumptions on asset returns, 
technical discount rate, etc). 
• Multi-year models face a technical problem in determining future liability values 
(nested Monte Carlo within Monte Carlo simulation). They use approximations such 
as closed form solutions to value embedded options. This can only make partial 
allowance for management actions and policyholder behaviour. 
• In some multi-year risk assessment models, the embedded options and guarantees are 
not valued at time 0, but the cash flow impact of options and guarantees is taken into 
consideration in each of the years in the projection period. Market values are not so 
relevant since the model aims at total balance sheet requirement. Simple rules apply if 
the option is in the money. 
 
DNB 
Each embedded option must be valued. This is an option available to the issuer or holder of an 
instrument that is built into the investment. 
 
Prudential supervision requires the realistic value of the pension and insurance liabilities to be 
established by a suitable method applied consistently and uniformly. The principle in this is 
that DNB does not prescribe a technique, but checks that every institution applies relevant 
methods that are widely recognised internationally. 
 
BPV 
Embedded options and guarantees have to be modelled, methodology has to be disclosed to 
the regulator. If policyholders are assumed to behave sub-optimally, the evidence for this 
behavioural assumption has to be shown. 
 
BaFin 
We expect the most important options and guarantees to the modelled in both the valuation 
and the risk models. 
 
7.3.5 Time horizon 
 
In principle, valuations take into account the full life of the contracts (up to 120 years). For 
practical purposes this life span can be truncated. The remainder of the cash flows is either 
neglected since minute or summarized in a terminal cash flow.  
 
• 5 participants consider complete run-off 
• 7 participants truncate at 25 to 65 years. 
 
DNB 
The time horizon used for valuation purposes equals the maturity of the liabilities. 
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BaFin 
In principle, all future cash flows affect the valuation. 
 
7.3.6 Going concern vs. run-off  
 
Taking anticipated new business into account may lower the current value of (future) 
insurance liabilities, if the anticipated new business is assumed to be profitable. A going 
concern without assuming new business does still take into account future premiums of in 
force business. 
 
• 11 participants take no more than one year of new business into account. That is, the 
in force business at the measurement date is run-off without considering new business. 
However, where relevant (e.g. short tailed non-life), anticipated new business or 
renewals are accounted for.  
• 2 participants take two to four years of anticipated new business into account 
  
DNB 
The valuation of the assets and liabilities are based on going concern assumption. For the 
determination of the realistic value new business is not taken into account. 
 
BPV 
New business during one year 
 
BaFin 
The valuation of the assets and liabilities are based on going concern assumptions. 
 
7.3.7 Level of valuation  
 
There is no clear trend with regard to the level of valuation. Many internal models run on 
business unit levels and are not uniform across business units. Their scope and complexity 
depend on the size of the business unit and the software platform available.  In general terms, 
we observed the following valuation levels in use 
 
• Assets:  
o instrument level (e.g. bond coupon payments for immediate annuities) 
o grouped by asset classes (e.g. government bonds, corporate bonds, equity, etc) 
o grouped by business segments or geography 
• Liabilities: 
o Contract level 
o Grouped by issue quarter/year 
o Grouped by technical rate, minimum guarantee, profit sharing mechanism  
o Homogeneous groups of risk types 
o Short tail, long tail business 
o On replicating portfolio basis 
 
Note: If the valuation is based on expectation, then it should be additive, hence aggregation 
level invariant. However, this does not apply for the risk margin in general. 
 
DNB 
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Valuation at the level of homogeneous risk groups. 
 
BPV 
The level of valuation is up to the company. 
 
BaFin 
Since the mathematical core of valuation is an expectation (under the risk neutral measure if 
risk premia/valuation margins are explicitly considered) valuation is additive. Hence the 
aggregate result is independent of the aggregation level. Valuation is essential for P&L-
attribution. Thus every business unit that is to be risk controlled needs to have valuation and 
P&L-attribution.   
 
7.3.8 Equalization reserves and future potential catastrophic losses 
 
All participants consider equalization reserves as part of the (risk bearing) shareholder equity 
capital. Future potential catastrophic losses (of in force liabilities) are captured by the risk 
model and charged accordingly by required capital. Multi-period run-off risk assessment 
models capture in principle future potential losses beyond a one year time horizon, which 
makes equalization reserves an implicit part of required capital. 
 
DNB 
The overall aim of the proposal is to provide a more transparent, more risk sensitive and more 
comparable starting point for regulators and firms to assess a firm’s capital needs.  
  
Within the proposed valuation principles one of the main objectives is to achieve a realistic 
valuation of the liabilities. Within this valuation context equalization provisions will be non-
existing.  
 
Within the standardised method of the Solvency test catastrophic risk is not included. For 
firms applying the standardised method catastrophe risk should be dealt within Pillar II 
simultaneously with the judgement of the re-insurance program.  
 
BPV 
Equalization reserves are risk-bearing capital.   
 
BaFin 
The risk modelling should be consistent with the way equalization reserves influence P&L. 
We expect valuation to be influenced by the prices of reinsurance contracts. Natural 
catastrophes with reliable statistical data should be considered as risk drivers in the risk model 
if the company is exposed to those risks. 
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 8 Modelling of risk variables and dependencies 
 
From a note of the European Commission to the Solvency Subcommittee (Markt 2085/01): 
“A risk-based capital system is a system in which the minimum capital requirement is based 
on the risk – or risks – facing an insurance company. This is thus a very broad definition. It 
may include the European minimum margin rule: using simple indicators, this rule seeks to 
set a capital requirement in terms of the business fluctuations that occur once a company has 
set aside sufficient technical provisions and holds appropriate investments.” 
  
We believe that an internal risk-based capital adequacy system should go beyond absorbing 
the normal business fluctuations. The sources of randomness are uncertain cash flows and 
future asset and liability values, which again are caused by more fundamental underlying 
random risk factors.  
 
There are many definitions of risk. A useful one was published in 1995 by Standards 
Australia and Standards New Zealand: 
 
“Risk – the chance of something happening that will have an impact upon objectives. It is 
measured in terms of consequences and likelihood.” 
 
This definition implies that risk may entail both upside as well as downside impacts.  
 
The mathematical model is a random variable (quantifies “consequences”) defined on a 
probability space (quantifies “likelihood”). Risk is quantified by applying a risk measure to 
the resulting (e.g. P&L) probability distribution. 
 
8.1 Risk classification  
 
The IAA Working Party categorizes risk under the four major headings market risk, credit 
risk, insurance risk (underwriting risk), and operational risk. 
 
Each risk type is further decomposed into three components 
• Volatility risk: random fluctuations due to chance; the diversifiable risk component. In 
fully efficient markets, volatility is not market-valued, since investors can diversify 
their portfolio. However, insurance policyholders cannot diversify this component 
away and therefore need protection against volatility. Examples: chance (random) 
fluctuations in both numbers of claims (frequency) and amount of claims (severity); 
normal day to day fluctuations of market values. 
• Uncertainty risk: uncertainty about model parameters due to sampling error and 
uncertainty in modelling the future. Cannot be diversified. Examples: mis-
specification of models for frequency and severity (model risk); parameters in selected 
model (parameter risk); use of incorrect or mis-calibrated model for market value or 
interest rate movements 
• Extreme event risk: risk of large common-cause event; calamity, high-impact, low-
frequency risks. Models may not capture all aspects of extreme risk especially if no 
extreme events appear in the historical data used to develop models. Examples: 
catastrophe with multiple claims; market crash or extreme interest rate movements.  
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Quantitatively assessed risks lead to capital charges; qualitatively assessed risks do not 
explicitly lead to capital charges but affect the management processes. 
 
8.1.1 Market risks  
 
The prevalent risk drivers are 
• Principal components of the yield curve 
• Equity indices 
• FX rates 
• Real estate indices 
• Etc 
 
Market risk types (e.g. interest rates) apply across different economic zones and need to be 
cross-correlated. 
 
For FX there is a distinction between functional FX risk (the potential FX mismatch between 
liability cash flow and its backing asset portfolio) and translation FX risk (the potential FX 
mismatch between different asset/liability sub-portfolios).  
 
Functional FX risk matters for capital adequacy: when liabilities and backing assets or 
supporting capital are not currency matched (structural risk), FX movements can lead to less 
capital supporting the same liabilities. 
 
Translation FX risk does not matter for capital adequacy: when liabilities, backing assets and 
supporting capital are currency matched, movements in capital occur (translation risk) but the 
relation between risk and capital remains the same. 
 
Several methods have been proposed to take these aspects into account (see e.g. Artzner P., 
Delbaen F.,  Koch P.: Risk measures and efficient use of capital, ETH Working paper 2005). 
 
Multi-year risk assessments capture the functional currency mismatch risk by explicit 
dynamic modelling of the FX rates. 
 
For 10 participants, currency mismatch leads to a capital charge. If a replicating portfolio is 
used for valuation then the currency mismatch is included in the asset risks. Otherwise, 
simplified methods are applied, such as flat percentage charges. 
 
The mentioned reasons for not charging currency mismatch risk with capital are: it is not 
considered a material risk or it is qualitatively assessed in a separate framework.  
 
It is recommended that functional mismatch is being eliminated. A participant observed: 
where a business unit has only small amounts of foreign investments they may ignore them. 
Often the additional exchange risk is more than offset by the diversification benefit of 
investing in a different economy 
 
DNB  
For market risks, the scenario approach in the standardised method for the solvency test 
applies. See Section 8.4.1 “Formal definitions in use”.  
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Currency mismatch does not play a role in the valuation of assets and liabilities. The 
standardised method determines the desired solvency for foreign exchange risk in a scenario. 
For the total foreign currency position, and taking account of the applicable investment 
policy, the institution has to determine the effect on the surplus of a fall in value of all other 
currencies against the euro of 25%. 
 
BPV 
Market risks are assessed by RiskMetrics methodology. Currency risk is taken into account. 
 
BaFin 
We expect a variety of models and are open to innovations. FX rates should be a risk driver if 
P&L is affected by FX. 
 
8.1.2 Credit risks 
 
The investment credit risk is modelled in a sophisticated way, which is consistent with the 
banking standards. Default, migration, spread and spread volatility risks are considered. 
Industry standard models in use are: KMV, Credit Risk+, S&P. Some participants mention 
that these standard models may be too conservative, since they do not allow for future 
rebalancing (e.g. selling bonds) of the portfolio. 
 
Often the economic scenario generator for market risks is also used for investment credit risk. 
 
The reinsurance default risk is quantitatively assessed, with only a few exceptions among the 
participants, where this risk is claimed not material. For the quantitative modelling, in house 
developments (stochastic factor models, implemented by Monte Carlo method) are in use. 
 
We recommend that the dependencies between reinsurance defaults, market risks and 
catastrophic losses are taken into account. 
 
DNB  
Credit risk is expressed in the credit spread. This is the difference between the effective yields 
on a collection of cash flows whose payment depends on the creditworthiness of 
counterparties and the effective yields on the same collection of cash flows as if they were 
certain to be paid. Generally, bonds of a highly creditworthy government are regarded as 
default free. In practice, therefore, the credit spread of, say, corporate bonds is derived by 
comparing the effective yield on a corporate bond with the effective yield on a government 
bond. As well as corporate loans, a claim on counterparty, for example, a re-insurer, 
intermediary or counterparty in a private derivatives contract, may also carry credit risk. 
  
The standardised method does not determine the desired solvency for every different 
investment with credit risk or claim on a counterparty. The desired solvency is derived by 
changing the observed credit spread on the investment portfolio (including claims for 
example, on re-insurers or intermediaries) by a certain fixed factor. This means that the shock 
is lower in absolute terms if the credit spread observed at the reporting date is low. The extent 
to which an institution is sensitive to the shock in the credit spread depends on the maturity 
characteristics of the cash flows and claims in the portfolio. 
 
As a rule, credit risk distinguishes between systematic and non-systematic risk components. 
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Systematic credit risk refers to regular market movements in credit spreads. Non-systematic 
credit risk plays a role if the change in credit spread comes from a change in the issuer’s 
credit rating. Non-systematic credit risk is also known as idiosyncratic credit risk. Other than 
concentration of risks (for example, a large claim on a re-insurer), it is likely that the 
idiosyncratic credit risk for individual pension funds and insurers is limited. It is also 
plausible that these institutional investors have a preference, under mandate restrictions, for 
loans with high creditworthiness (for example, at least investment grade). Consequently, the 
scenario for credit risk has a simple design. 
 
The standardised method determines the desired solvency for credit risk in a scenario. Given 
the total investment portfolio, claims on counterparties and taking account of the investment 
policy, the institution has to determine the effect on the surplus of an immediate increase in 
credit spreads of 60% [pension funds: 40%] compared with the actual credit spread at the 
reporting date. For example, if the observed spread is equal to 100 basis points, the solvency 
test has to calculate the effect of an increase to 160 basis points. The effect on the surplus of a 
rise of 60 basis points is the desired solvency for credit risk. An approximation using 
information already available to compute the realistic value may be used in determining the 
desired solvency for credit risk. 
  
BPV 
Credit modelling: Basel II or full internal model 
 
BaFin 
We expect a variety of models and are open to innovations. 
 
8.1.3 Insurance risks 
 
For life insurance, the typical method is factor based. The main risk drivers mentioned 
throughout are mortality, morbidity, persistency and lapse risk. Market risk drivers, such as 
interest rates, should be modelled top down and across business units to capture the 
systematic impact of such risks. Local risk, such as mortality, can be modelled at lower levels. 
When there is partial functional dependence between risk factors (such as lapse rates 
depending on interest rates), then this should be captured appropriately. E.g. interest rates 
drive lapse rates according to some formula, taking into account some statistically significant 
residual risk. 
 
At least 2 participants mentioned to just shocking these insurance parameters: the stressed 
parameter result gives required capital (“worst case”). 6 participants use a full stochastic 
factor model life insurance risk, 3 participants use a variance-covariance method. 
 
A general remark of a participant is remarkable and should be guideline for any internal 
model: “Our internal capital assessment approach is evolving. This means that the balance 
between stochastic modelling and deterministic stress tests (downside estimates) is changing 
constantly, as our understanding and confidence in our stochastic models improves.” 
 
For non-life insurance the IAA recommends special consideration of  
1. Heterogeneity of risks: requires the forming of homogeneous risk groups, such as lines 
of business and the distinction of basic, large, cumulative and catastrophic claims 
losses, short and long tailed business. 
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2. Substantial effects of correlation between different non-life insurance risks: requires 
an appropriate dependency structure in the stochastic model. 
3. Difference between reserving risk (outstanding claims liabilities) and premium risk 
(inherent in unearned premiums): requires separate modelling of reserving and 
premium risk. 
4. Annual renewal for the vast majority of the business: going concern (including 
anticipated new business) vs. run-off (no new business taken into account). 
5. Significant role played by reinsurance (especially in relation to concentration of risk): 
effect of reinsurance and default of reinsurance. 
 
A great variety of models are in use, complying more or less with the above IAA aspects 1-5. 
We recommend that compliance with these IAA aspects is improved. In particular, that 
• premium risk is adequately modelled. E.g. basic losses: modelling of loss ratio 
distributions (scaling by premium), triangulation data is included in modelling process 
where necessary. Large losses: collective models (frequency scaling by premium). 
Natural catastrophes: collective models (severity scaling by probable maximal loss 
measure) using geoscientists expertise.  
• the risk of under-reserving and cost inflation is appropriately assessed. 
• the dependencies between lines of business and premium and reserving risk are 
captured. 
  
DNB 
An institution has to maintain capital for underwriting risks. Solvency for these risks is 
desired for abnormal negative variations in underwriting results within a year, given the 
provision at realistic value. The desired solvency is determined for each risk group to be 
reported. The life and non-life sectors are separated for this. The same risk groups are used as 
for market value margins in the context of the realistic value.  
 
Where applicable, some degree of diversification between the risk groups is allowed for when 
aggregating the solvency results for the risk groups to the total desired solvency for 
underwriting risks. Annexe 4 of the FTK consultation document provides details for 
determining the desired solvency for underwriting risk using the standardised method. 
 
BPV 
Life: Covariance approach, P&C distribution based model 
 
BaFin 
We expect a variety of models and are open to innovations. 
 
8.1.4 Operational risks 
 
We recommend that a clear and standardized sub-classification of operational risks is 
developed as a first step towards a systematic quantitative assessment. Objective of any 
standards should be to provide behavioural incentives towards greater understanding and 
management of such risks. Operational risks should be in Pillar II until there is sufficient 
industry data available to build sound statistical models.  
 
• 7 participants use a flat percentage rule (10-20% of either available or other risk 
capital, possibly separate rates per line of business) for the operational risk capital 
add-on charge. 
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• 3 participants are using stochastic operational risk models. 
• 3 participants mentioned other methods to estimate the (e.g. aggregate) annual cost of 
operational risk (e.g. based on historical data, or by a qualitative analysis). 
 
Moreover, at least 2 participants are developing stochastic operational risk models. 
 
The following observations could serve as benchmarks for further developments: 
• The model incorporates a bonus/malus system based on portfolio reviews with the aim 
of not only quantifying but reducing operational risk.  
• Taxonomy: operational risks that are already captured in the main model (either by 
required capital or as a liability), or for which capital is not the appropriate response 
are filtered out. 
• Frequency-severity model:  
1. The main operational risks are captured in each business unit through scenario 
analysis with senior business and risk managers. The scenario analysis process 
includes defining the 'story' behind each risk scenario and determining frequency 
and severity parameters. These assessments are based on a wide range of 
information, including existing risk reporting, audit reports and plans, relevant 
external losses from the Fitch F1RST database and other sources, such as ORX, 
other business units' scenarios, external-consultant experience and the BIS II event 
type taxonomy.  
2. Some industry-standard distributions are then fitted to each scenario's frequency 
and severity parameters.  
3. Dependencies between different operational risks and other risk types are captured 
through careful definition and vetting of the scenarios.  
• Simple add-on models: an aggregate operational risk charge is determined by 
combining the anticipated costs for the identified operational risks, assuming a degree 
of correlation and a confidence level. 
 
DNB  
Comprehensive consideration of all relevant risk factors is needed for operating risk. 
Institutions have to identify value and report operating risk. DNB proposes to assess and 
discuss these findings with the institution. It also wants to issue a report on this at an 
aggregated level along with the industry. In this way, DNB intends to raise understanding of 
operating risk to a higher level and, on the basis of this, to develop simple rules for the 
standardised method of the Solvency test. 
 
BPV 
Operational risks: in Pillar 2. 
 
BaFin 
We expect a variety of models and are open to innovations. 
 
8.1.5 Intra-group risks  
 
The hypothetical netting of intra-group risks (participations, loans, retrocession, etc) at group 
level requires fungibility of capital and may be restricted by regulatory minimum capital 
requirements. This aspect is further discussed in connection with aggregation and 
diversification of risks (see Section 9.2 “Fungibility of capital”). From a purely frictionless 
economic point of view, however, intra-group risks do cancel out at group level. 
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• 8 participants do not consider intra-group risks at group level (netting out assumption). 
Some of these participants mention to consider this pure economic approach as a 
starting point to be further developed.  
• One participant models explicitly capital transfers and cash-flows from business units 
to group and vice versa and across business units, taking into account fungibility 
constraints. 
• Some participants are reviewing this aspect at this time. 
 
At legal entity level, intra-group debt should be given highest seniority to avoid double 
gearing.  
 
We recommend that internal models are developed towards capturing the real side effects of 
intra-group transactions, at least qualitatively, say by a 3-4 year cash-flow test. 
 
DNB 
Not specifically addressed within the FAF. 
 
BPV 
Participations are modelled like a share (but with 25% more volatility, fully correlated to 
share index). 
 
BaFin 
In general, the supervisor is to be informed about intra group transactions. Intra group 
transactions are neutralized in the consolidated group report, however, and hence do not effect 
the solvency requirement and the available capital. (Basis for the available capital of the 
group is the consolidated balance sheet.)  
 
8.1.6 Model uncertainty  
 
According to the IAA proposal, each risk type is split into: model uncertainty, volatility, 
extreme event (calamity) risk. Hence model uncertainty is captured quantitatively as “model 
parameter uncertainty”.  
 
Qualitative assessment of model uncertainty is through actuarial judgement where parameter 
estimates or model appropriateness is in doubt. 
 
Quantitative assessment can be through 
• The choice of a very high confidence level or holding a minimum amount of excess 
capital (mentioned by 2 participants) 
• A conservative choice of the model parameters, e.g. as a result of downside stress tests 
(mentioned by 3 participants) 
• Implicit modelling of parameter error, comparable to the IAA proposal (mentioned by 
2 participants) 
 
At least 3 participants mentioned that quantitative internal assessment methods are being 
(further) developed. 
 
In summary, there is no clear trend and homogeneity among the participants. We recommend, 
in a first step, that model uncertainty is qualitatively assessed (e.g. through plausibility and 
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sensitivity checks, statistical back-testing where available, etc.). Important is to know the 
sensitivity of the results towards variations of the key parameters. See also the BaFin 
comments. 
 
BPV 
Model uncertainty is not taken into account. 
 
BaFin 
We expect parameter uncertainty to be taken into account “automatically” in the sense that the 
predictions of the model are continuously compared to realizations in the P&L attribution 
process. The scale of the residual, unexplained P&L is measured out-of-sample instead of in-
sample and thus contains the noise stemming from parameter/estimation uncertainty. The 
“sensitivity analyses” have the goal to test the influence of certain model assumptions and 
quantify weaknesses of the model. (See point 5.4 in the BaFin White Paper.) 
 
8.1.7 Quantitatively assessed risks  
 
All participants (including the regulators) are consistent with the IAA major risk 
classification. The major categories are further split into risk-types, which vary across the 
participants, such as 
• Market risk: FX, equity, interest rates, real estate, inflation, GDP, etc 
• Credit risk: counterparty default (reinsurance or derivative), migration, spread, etc 
• Insurance risk: life (mortality, morbidity, persistency, etc), non-life (per line of 
business, basic (attritional) losses, large losses, cumulative losses, etc), health 
• Operational risk: Business, Compliance, Fraud, Legal, Administration, Staff, Physical 
Assets, Systems, Tax, etc, but also model parameters such as mortality, morbidity and 
persistency rates are mentioned under operational risks 
 
Operational risks are either quantitatively modelled or qualitatively assessed, and may or may 
not lead to a capital charge, see below. 
 
A few participants consider concentration risks, both in investment and insurance exposure.  
 
8.1.8 Qualitatively assessed risks  
 
As for the qualitatively assessed risk types 
• 9 participants mention operational risks (4 of them charge capital according to a flat 
percentage rate of both, available and required capital) 
• 3 participants mention liquidity risk 
• 2 participants mention strategy and reputation risk 
• Regulatory, reinsurance counter-party exposure risks are mentioned each by one 
participant, respectively 
 
8.1.9 Pillar I or II  
 
There is consensus among the participants that all quantifiable risks should be under Pillar I, 
preferably based on the internal models. 
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Operational risks impose a challenge, for insurers in particular, because of the current general 
lack of sufficient quantitative data. According to the IAA, there can be no experience-based 
explicit Pillar I requirement for insurers at this time.  
 
This view is shared by the majority of the participants: 8 participants mention operational risk 
explicitly as part of Pillar II. 3 of them consider particular sub-types of operational risk also to 
be in Pillar I. Only 2 participants see operational risk exclusively under Pillar I at this time. 
 
The IAA gives a particular hint to liquidity risk (exposure to losses when a company has to 
borrow unexpectedly or sell assets for an unanticipated low price). They recommend a 
qualitative assessment that is subject to Pillar II. According to some participants, companies 
should demonstrate that they have a strong liquidity position via comprehensive group-wide 
liquidity modelling. This can be a supervisory issue but not capital. 
 
DNB 
All risks mentioned above should be included in pillar I. 
 
BPV 
The mentioned risks are in pillar I. 
  
BaFin 
BaFin views operational risks to be covered by Pillar I in Solvency II. This might be 
computed in a crude way (similar to the basic method in Basel II) for the standard formula as 
a place holder for future improvements. Statistical OpRisk modelling in the internal model 
should be linked to the risk management process through performance indicators and quality 
criteria of business processes. 
   
8.2 Model classification 
 
Based on the analysed internal systems we found the following model classification 
appropriate: 
 
Scenario based model  
The risk capital calculation implies measuring the impact of (company) specific scenarios to 
the total P&L distribution. Theses scenarios are distinct from stress tests (sensitivity analysis, 
shocks) where individual risk drivers are varied. A scenario is a description of a complete 
alternate state of the world. This includes generic scenarios such as earthquakes or 
windstorms. 
 
Examples: SST (see below). DCAT (Dynamic Capital Adequacy Testing, OSFI Canada): the 
company’s activity is projected through the model for some specified future period (3 to 5 
years). These projections are made under a variety of scenarios of possible future experience. 
The scenarios are usually chosen on a deterministic basis. In some circumstance, scenarios 
may be chosen stochastically, but only where appropriate probability distributions of relevant 
experience factors exist. 
 
Static factor model  
The risk capital calculation is based on a linear combination of static factors (“risk weights”) 
multiplied with company specific size measures. No stochastic cash flow modelling is made. 
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Static factor models are simple and can be calibrated to an average (small) insurer. However, 
they are too simple to be truly risk specific. Diversification benefits or reinsurance effects are 
difficult to integrate.  
 
We recommend that the internal risk models do not incorporate static factor models, unless 
they refer to the “normal business fluctuations” and are in-house recalibrated on a continuous 
basis.  
 
Examples: Solvency I, Basel II  
 
Covariance model  
The risk capital calculation is based on an aggregation of single risk numbers by simple sum 
or square root formulae. Also called: “VaR model”, “variance-covariance model”, “RBC 
model”. 
 
The sensitivity of the total P&L with respect to the risk factors is portfolio specific and 
determined by a first-order sensitivity analysis (estimating the “Deltas”). Each single risk 
driver is then “shocked”, that is, put at its predetermined quantile value. This quantile value is 
a multiple of the standard deviation, which is derived from historical time series or model 
based. The resulting portfolio values are recorded and aggregated according to a correlation 
matrix. This is the DNB standard “scenario approach” described in Section 8.4.1.  
 
The covariance method implicitly assumes a linear dependence of the total P&L on multi-
normal (or Bernoulli) distributed risk factors. This method is therefore of limited suitability 
for large movements of the risk factors (heavy tailed distributions) and non-linear instruments 
(e.g. options). The accuracy of the covariance method can be improved by using the IAA sub-
risk classification including the risk components volatility, uncertainty and calamity. 
 
The covariance model does not behave associatively when it comes to aggregation across 
different hierarchical levels, which may cause temporal instability of the results (see Henk 
van Broekhoven, “How to calculate diversification”, March 17, 2005). See also the example 
in Section 9.1.1 “Allocation methods in use”. 
 
Examples: RBC models, S&P, Risk Metrics, ICA (Internal Capital Assessment) models 
 
Stochastic factor model  
The risk capital calculation is based on an aggregated P&L distribution:  
1. Identification: the relevant risk drivers (risk factors) are identified.  
2. Sensitivity analysis: each individual risk driver value is varied over a reasonable range 
to determine the functional dependency of the portfolio value on this factor. This 
results in a Delta (proxy for the first derivative), Gamma (proxy for the second 
derivative), or a scenario vector (evaluation of portfolio at several knot points, for 
highly non-linear functional dependency.) 
3. Joint distribution of risk drivers is modelled. This includes dependency modelling 
between the single risk factors via copulas or correlations (for multi-normal 
distributions). For individual risk factors, many possible models from actuarial 
science, finance and economics are available.  
4. The resulting P&L distribution is aggregated across all risk types, leading to its full 
stochastic distribution. 
5. The risk capital is given by applying a risk measure to the total P&L distribution. 
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The full stochastic factor model can be dynamically implemented using economic scenario 
generators (such as the commercial tool of Barrie and Hibberts). This is often the basis for the 
valuation of insurance liabilities. It may include a dynamic implementation of business 
strategies: e.g. rules that determine the portfolio composition as a function of the simulated 
sample path. 
 
However, for the risk assessment, most participants use a stochastic factor model on a one-
year time horizon. It has to be emphasized, though, that one-year changes of certain risk 
factors can have an impact on the entire cash flows beyond that one year. An example is the 
lapse rate, which can change due to new information coming in over the year (such as market 
forecasts) and which then affects the anticipated future lapses underlying the liability value at 
the end of that year.  
 
The covariance model can be seen as a special stochastic factor model, with multi-normal 
(and/or Bernoulli) distributions, first-order (Delta) sensitivities and VaR as risk measure 
(which in this case is a multiple of the standard deviation). 
 
Examples: SST (partly), internal models 
 
The SST includes a hybrid of stochastic factor and scenario based modelling. Scenarios are 
specified and given weights. The conditional P&L distributions given the scenarios are 
determined and aggregated according to the weights. Scenarios thus have an immediate effect 
on the resulting aggregate P&L distribution. Double counting is avoided by weighting the 
scenarios. 
 
Generally speaking, the modelled distributions are intended to be objective (empirically 
estimated) and not to be stressed. However, since no participant is able to model all risks 
stochastically, they do incorporate deterministic stress tests (“downside scenarios”: e.g. on 
lapse rates, calibrated to an appropriate confidence level) into their stochastic models. This 
means that the distributions can e.g. include some shift to represent the effect of these 
stresses. A technical committee has to choose these parameters in a consistent way. 
 
It is interesting to observe that many participants start with calibrating a stochastic factor 
model, and translate it in a tabular form, which is then practically used as a covariance model. 
This is claimed to serve for better communication between the risk management unit and the 
rest of the staff. We believe that this is a matter of culture and education, which can be 
improved and adapted if necessary. 
 
It is difficult to give a clear count of how many participants use which of the above models. 
The above classification is not exclusive, a covariance model (and even a simple factor 
model) can in principle be seen as a stochastic factor model which is translated in a tabular 
form. Most participants use different models at the same time, e.g. at different levels. 
However, we can roughly say that 
• 5 participants use a covariance model 
• 8 participants use a stochastic factor model (3 of them on a multi-year time horizon) 
 
We recommend that the aggregate P&L distribution is considered in any case, since only then 
one can answer the following important stability questions: 
• How does the required capital depend on the confidence level (varying the confidence 
level)? 
 58
• Given the available capital, what is the corresponding confidence level (finding the 
maximal confidence level)?  
 
DNB 
The principle in this is that DNB does not prescribe a technique, but checks that every 
institution applies relevant methods that are widely recognised internationally. Distributions 
could be based at the level of homogeneous risk groups. 
 
BPV 
Hybrid of stochastic factor and scenario based model. 
 
BaFin 
We view it as the defining property of a risk model that it generates a statistically estimated 
probability distribution of losses and future asset and liability values, on the top and at least 
one lower level. 
 
8.3 Dependencies 
 
Dependencies between market, credit, insurance and operational risks are considered 
throughout. The following aspects mentioned by the participants are worthwhile to be listed: 
• Dependencies between loss ratios of different business segments, across different 
business units, to incorporate the premium cycle.  
• Dependencies between large non-life losses and natural hazards across geographic 
regions.  
• Dependencies between insurance losses and market risks. E.g. through price inflation, 
or lapses linked to credited rate, credited rate linked to market conditions, actual 
surplus, etc. 
• Major scenarios are assessed with a view towards identifying cross impact effects. In 
this respect the 9/11 event has brought cross impacts to greater awareness, and 
dependencies that before that event had been identified but considered negligible, have 
received a new assessment. 
• Dependencies between reinsurance defaults, world equity markets (USD as a proxy) 
and catastrophe losses. 
• Dependencies between market risks within as well as across geographies. 
• Dependencies between operational risks: scenarios are carefully defined and vetted so 
as to capture all closely (cor)related events within one scenario. 
• Inter-temporal dependencies between e.g. asset returns. 
 
We recommend that dependencies are consistently modelled across different levels: 
• Central simulation of market risk factors, applied uniformly to all business units 
• Central modelling of specific catastrophe events taking account of the geographic 
reach of such catastrophe events 
• The covariance method should be based on the correlations across the lowest possible 
levels (see Henk van Broekhoven, “How to calculate diversification”, March 17, 
2005). 
 
As to how dependencies are modelled, a mixture of correlations, copulas and tail adjustment 
are in use. 
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• Copulas: in partial use by 6 participants. At least 2 participants use copulas for back-
testing their covariance models. 
• Correlations: obviously the exact method for jointly normal distributed risk factors. 
Hence in partial use by all participants. 
• Tail adjustments: expert opinion based judgement on dependencies where empirical 
data basis is not available. Enforced importance sampling, can be used in connection 
with Monte-Carlo sampling, setting “manually” a few additional sample points in 
extreme regions on the diagonal. (see e.g. Mueller, Blum, Wallin: Bootstrapping the 
economy”) 
 
We recommend that the shortfall of correlation aggregation is mitigated: 
• Using “tail-correlations” (=stressed correlations, based on expert opinion), back-tested 
by full stochastic models including copulas 
• Replacing a stand alone VaR by a TailVaR where appropriate (e.g. for very heavy 
tailed marginal distributions, to capture the potential losses beyond the quantile) 
 
Dependencies should be based as much as possible on empirical data, but this is often 
inconclusive in which case management judgement needs to be applied. This judgment is 
based on various combinations of specifically constructed stress assumptions, reasonableness-
testing and sensitivity analysis. 
 
It is also conceivable that the exact form of a joint distribution is known for other, say, 
scientific reasons (see e.g. Juri, A., Wüthrich, M. V., 2002. Copula convergence theorems for 
tail events. Insurance: Math. Econom. 30, 405-420.) 
 
8.4 Scenarios 
8.4.1 Formal definitions in use 
 
We have observed the following four basic formal definitions of a scenario (there have been 
multiple mentions): 
  
Event/hypothesis (mentioned by 2 participants): a description of a complete alternate state 
of the world. Theses scenarios are often given a probability weight and are thus distinct from 
stress tests (sensitivity analysis, shocks) where one single risk driver is varied. They can also 
be expressed as compound Poisson distributions (frequency/severity). A good practice is if 
frequency and severity parameters are defined by experts and senior business and risk 
managers from each business unit and group risk management. These scenarios can also be 
the basis for a risk analysis where empirical data is missing and expert judgement is needed, 
e.g. for operational risk. 
 
The event/hypothesis scenarios focus on the tail of the risks (e.g. a specific airplane crash, or 
an operational risk scenario).  
 
Event/hypothesis scenarios are used in the SST. It is an open problem how the SST 
aggregation formula for scenarios (weighted mixture of distributions) compares to the 
compound Poisson distribution (frequency/severity) modelling.  
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Deterministic projection (mentioned by 4 participants): the company’s activity is 
projected for some specified future period. The scenarios are chosen on a deterministic basis, 
based on expert opinion. Used for qualitative assessment (e.g. “stress tests”), such as the DNB 
continuity test or the DCAT.  
 
Deterministic projections may constitute an essential part of the calibration process. 
 
Randomly generated sample path (mentioned by 7 participants): one of many sample 
paths generated in a stochastic simulation (Monte Carlo simulation) to approximate the 
probability space. They are drawn form pre-defined, calibrated distributions (e.g. stochastic 
differential equations) implied by a random generator. This requires the specification of 
dynamic risk factors and their joint distribution across time. Dependencies are incorporated 
using e.g. hierarchical structures.  
 
Randomly generated sample paths do not exclusively contribute to the tail range of the risk 
factors (unless importance sampling is applied, which is in use by at least 2 participants). In 
part this is because what might be a good outcome for one business unit might be a bad 
outcome for another, or indeed the whole group. For instance, in some businesses the capital 
falls if interest rates rise, while for others it falls if interest rates fall. A further reason for 
considering the full range of outcomes is the desire to use the stochastic models for other 
business purposes, such as valuation and value-based management. This requires a full 
distribution of outcomes, and an understanding of the correlation with market behaviour, to 
assist with the valuation of uncertain cash flows. 
 
Sensitivity or stress test (mentioned by 5 participants): a single risk factor is varied and 
the impact on the portfolio value determined. A sensitivity/stress test is used to get an 
approximation of the risk exposure. It is in particular applied in connection with the 
covariance model, where the scenarios are by definition (e.g. 99.8% VaR) tail events of 
empirical and/or modelled distributions of the risk factors. 
 
DNB 
One could describe the method as a single event approach. The scenario approach in the 
standardised method for the solvency test applies to the market risk and credit risk categories. 
Market risk consists of interest rate risk, inflation risk, equity risk, real estate risk, raw 
materials risk and foreign exchange risk.  
 
This scenario approach is based on the technical assumption of a shock occurring in one risk 
factor immediately after a reporting date and the resulting revaluation of balance sheet items 
remaining unchanged until the end of the year. All volume effects, such as a sharp fall in 
capital market interest rates bringing about early repayment of mortgages, are assumed to take 
place immediately. The scenarios, therefore, ignore the passage of time.  
 
The scenarios are defined as shock based changes in risk factors, reflected in differences from 
the actual balance at each reporting date: for example, a fall in the interest rate by a certain 
factor compared with the reporting date. The size of the shock, such as the size of interest rate 
changes, is a given. The extent to which the surplus (the balance of assets and liabilities at 
realistic value) changes as a result is established for each scenario. This simulated change in 
the surplus is equal to the desired solvency for that risk. For example, if there is an assumed 
fall in the stock market of 25% and the surplus declines by 1,000,000, this amount is the 
desired solvency for equity risk.  
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The extent to which an institution is sensitive to certain risks is determined by the nature of 
the institution, its liabilities and its investment policy. For example, an institution which has 
bought put-options on the equity portfolio has a lower desired solvency for this reason than an 
otherwise identical institution without this risk hedge.  
An institution must determine whether and the extent to which the various scenarios are 
relevant. It has to be able to estimate the financial consequences of the scenarios realistically 
and consistently over time.  
 
DNB sets the parameters in the scenarios below. Based on these fixed parameters, an 
institution can make a solvency plan for the future. 
 
BPV 
A scenario is considered as a specific or generic event. Conditional on the scenario there 
results a stressed P&L distribution (e.g. induced by stressed correlation matrix). Either a new 
distribution is calculated (for some market risk scenarios) or the ‘basis distribution’ is shifted 
by loss under a given scenario. The resulting distributions are aggregated by a weighted mix. 
Scenarios mainly contribute to characterize potential tail events (“extreme scenarios”). 
 
BaFin 
One should distinguish scenarios that are merely used to get an approximation of the risk 
exposure (e.g., scenario vectors and scenario matrices in the sense of Jamshidian and Zhu 
(1997)) on the one hand and scenarios that are used to approximate a probability space (e.g., 
Monte-Carlo scenarios) on the other hand. 
A method where scenarios mainly contribute to the tail range of the risks would be called 
importance sampling. It may be, but need not be used. 
 
8.4.2 Risks types and entities covered by scenarios  
 
All risks that are quantitatively assessed, and therefore all lines of business and geographic 
areas, have a scenario component. This applies in particular to those risk types which are 
randomly sampled (e.g. using an economic scenario generator on the asset side). 
 
The event/hypothesis type scenarios are mainly used to cover operational and catastrophic 
event risks. Specific events on the liability side are available for significant perils and regions.  
 
DNB 
The scenario approach in the standardised method for the solvency test applies to the market 
risk and credit risk categories. Market risk consists of interest rate risk, inflation risk, equity 
risk, real estate risk, raw materials risk and foreign exchange risk.  
 
BPV 
All types of risks can be covered by scenarios. The appointed actuary has to define scenarios 
which are relevant for the company. 
 
8.4.3 Number of scenarios 
 
Stochastic simulations include a mentioned range of 1000 to 1,000,000 random samples. It 
has been mentioned further that as few as 1000 simulations can give stable results for life 
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businesses without embedded options, while up to 100,000 may be required for a stand-alone 
P&C business with extreme catastrophe exposures.   
 
It is remarkable that some participants keep the number of scenarios as low as possible and 
that only a few of them determine overall risk. There is an obvious trade-off between 
robustness and reasonableness of the risk assessment and the theoretical accuracy of 
stochastic models. 
 
We recommend that for a stochastic simulation model enough random samples are drawn to 
ensure accuracy of the risk measurement. For the practical problems of estimating high 
quantiles see e.g. McNeil AJ and Saladin T: The peaks over thresholds method for estimating 
high quantiles of loss distributions. Proceedings of 28th International ASTIN Colloquium. 
 
The covariance model requires two scenarios per risk factor (up and down) per business unit, 
resulting in about 1000-3000 scenarios in practice.  
 
A typical value for a historical time series VaR calculation is 2300 sample points. 
 
BPV 
20+ 
 
8.4.4 Generation and weighting of scenarios 
 
Apart from those participants using a covariance model, 
• 7 participants use random number generators, including commercial products such as 
Barrie and Hibbert for economic scenarios, TAS P/C, Remetrica for P&C activity 
scenarios, etc.  
• 2 participants mention expert assessment 
• 3 participants use historical time series, bootstrapping methods. 
 
All randomly generated sample paths within a stochastic simulation are equally weighted.  
 
Event/hypothesis scenarios realized by frequency/severity models are weighted according to 
their frequency and severity. Moreover, the dependency assumptions between the scenarios 
and the group’s portfolio exposure towards the scenarios determine the resulting contribution 
to overall capital requirements. 
 
DNB  
The FTK scenario approach is based on the technical assumption of a shock occurring in one 
risk factor immediately after a reporting date and the resulting revaluation of balance sheet 
items remaining unchanged until the end of the year. 
 
The extent to which an institution is sensitive to certain risks is determined by the nature of 
the institution, its liabilities and its investment policy. For example, an institution which has 
bought put-options on the equity portfolio has a lower desired solvency for this reason than an 
otherwise identical institution without this risk hedge.  
An institution must determine whether and the extent to which the various scenarios are 
relevant. It has to be able to estimate the financial consequences of the scenarios realistically 
and consistently over time.  
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DNB sets the parameters in the scenarios below. Based on these fixed parameters, an 
institution can make a solvency plan for the future. 
 
BPV 
Scenarios are either historical, generic, or specific. Weighting is with the probability of event. 
 
8.5 Risk modelling principles 
 
8.5.1 Going concern vs. run-off  
 
Consistently with Section 7.3.6, 
 
• 11 participants take no more than one year of new business into account (but consider 
the in force business on a going-concern basis). Typically, in life business the balance 
sheet is cut off at the measurement date; whereas in non-life, the risk of the anticipated 
new business/renewals within the first year is taken into account. 
• 2 participants take two to four years of anticipated new business into account. 
 
New business becomes less material the higher the frequency of calculations (e.g. quarterly). 
 
New life business may dilute unrealised investment gains and hence reduce management 
flexibility. We recommend that separate multi-year (stochastic) growth studies are performed, 
such as the FTK continuity test. 
 
DNB 
No new business is taken into account in the FTK Solvency Test, other than renewals or 
arising from existing embedded options in the present insurance contracts. However, new 
business is taken into account within Continuity analysis. 
 
BPV 
Anticipated new business during one year is taken into account, effectively renewal of 
existing business. 
 
BaFin 
Anticipated new business should be included as risk driver, if it materially affects P&L. 
 
8.5.2 Time horizon 
 
According to the IAA, there will be some time delay between the date the supervisor can take 
appropriate action with respect to an unacceptably weak or insolvent insurer and the date the 
published financial statements of the insurer are produced. Therefore, from a supervisory 
point of view, the time horizon for the risk assessment should be one year at least.  
 
On the other hand, there is a trade-off between capturing the material risks associated with the 
run-off and the effects of sampling error on the accuracy of the measurement. 
 
We have observed that 
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• 10 participants assess their risks on a one year time horizon (at least one participant is 
planning to move from a one-year to a multi-year DFA assessment). 
• 3 participants assess their risks on a multi-year (5-30 years) time horizon. 
 
A participant mentioned that if units show to measure and react more frequently, then the time 
horizon for the risk assessment could be reduced to e.g. 6 months, reducing the amount of 
capital needed. This is, however, in conflict with the IAA recommendation from a supervisory 
point of view. 
 
We recommend that, beyond the one year risk assessment, (stochastic) multi-year studies are 
performed, such as the FTK continuity test. 
 
DNB 
The used time horizon is one year. 
 
BPV 
1 year 
 
BaFin 
1year 
 
8.5.3 Embedded options and guarantees 
 
Within a one year risk assessment, today’s value of options and guarantees has to be 
compared to the corresponding value in a year, which can depend on primary risk drivers, 
such as stock prices or interest rate levels, but also on implicit variables such as the future 
(implied) volatility of the primary drivers, or the future lapse rate assumptions. 
 
Within a multi-year risk assessment, the stochastic nature of all future asset returns is taken 
into account by the internal model. The corresponding risk therefore is captured by their 
impact on the future policyholder cash flows. Intermediate balance sheet solvency assessment 
requires the valuation of embedded options at any future time point. This causes technical 
difficulties due to the complexity of nested stochastic simulations. Here, either a simple 
formula proxy has to be applied or we recommend the adaptation of the Longstaff-Schwartz 
algorithm (see Section 7.3). 
 
• 9 participants do currently assess these risks explicitly.  
• The other participants are developing their models towards capturing these risks.   
 
DNB 
Analogously to the two interest rate movements, the effect on the desired solvency margin of 
an increase or decrease of 25% in interest rate volatility (implied volatility) has to be 
computed from the starting situation. This applies to interest rate options and/or interest rate 
dependent embedded options in the pension and insurance liabilities. The greatest loss is 
included when determining the desired solvency. 
 
BaFin 
Risks arising from embedded options and guarantees assessed should be assessed, if material. 
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8.5.4 Cash flow-matching/liquidity aspects  
 
For multi-year assessment models, cash flows are at the core of the model. However, liquidity 
aspects have to be taken into account to reflect the fact that the full value of the assets may not 
be realised if a sale is forced to meet liquidity demands. 
 
As for the cash flow matching (synonym for ALM or mismatch risk), 10 participants take this 
risk quantitatively into account (including those who use a multi-year assessment), by e.g. 
referring to the replicating portfolio and/or determining key rate sensitivities with respect to 
yield curve movements.  
 
All participants do a qualitative assessment of liquidity risk; we have not observed any capital 
charge. More specifically, 
• 3 participants perform liquidity tests based on the outcome of the internal risk model. 
E.g. the premium income and coupon payments over the next 2 years are compared to 
liability cash flows. 
• 5 participants mention a qualitative assessment in a broader risk management 
framework. E.g. within the treasury process, or the portfolio consists mostly of liquid 
instruments.  
 
Some participants mentioned deep short-term borrowing facilities (e.g. syndicate of banks) to 
manage potential liquidity crunches (for example P&C businesses potentially faced with 
catastrophe losses), and the on-going costs of these facilities are captured in the expense base 
 
We recommend that a comprehensive qualitative group-wide liquidity test is performed on a 
time horizon which allows for realistic refinancing programs (e.g. 2-4 years). 
 
DNB 
Risks associated with liquidity are reflected, at least in part, in the valuation. For example, 
limited negotiability of debt securities (such as private debt) is reflected in the observed credit 
spread. Liquidity risk is not separately addressed further in the standardised method. 
 
BPV    
The SST is cash flow based 
 
BaFin    
Exposure to interest rates should be available either through scenario vectors or sensitivities. 
 
8.5.5 Diversification over time 
 
A diversification effect across time for the required risk capital is captured in a multi-year 
assessment where subsequent asset returns are aggregated across time. The modelling 
assumptions (independence or mean-reversion of returns) are crucial and the resulting capital 
can be very sensitive with respect to these assumptions. We recommend that further studies 
are done in this direction. See e.g. Embrechts, P., Kaufmann, R., Patie, P.: Strategic long-term 
financial risks: single risk factors (ETH Working paper, 2004). 
 
On a one-year time horizon, this diversification effect is inherent in the best estimate asset 
return assumptions. E.g. when historical simulations are used for VaR calculations. See also 
the above mentioned paper. 
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 8.5.6 Market-cyclical effects 
 
Our observations are: 
• 3 participants do not assess market cyclical effects (but it is currently being 
investigated) 
• 6 participants account for market-cyclical effects in their best estimate assumptions 
concerning asset returns and anticipated market conditions. This can be based on over-
the-cycle historical estimates and expert opinion. 
• 4 participants account for market-cyclical effects in the variability of the asset return 
and loss ratio distributions. This is achieved through 
o Enhanced correlation between asset returns and loss ratios 
o Historical VaR calculations 
o Explicit multi-year pricing level cycle modelling 
 
We recommend that market-cyclical effects are explicitly taken into account by appropriate 
modelling and economic expert opinion. 
 
DNB 
It is assumed there is a perfect correlation of risks within variable-yield securities. The 
correlation between interest rates and shares (and variable-yield securities) is unstable over 
time; consequently, the standardised method uses a robust estimate, allowing for the 
parameter uncertainty in that correlation. A degree of diversification is assumed between 
variable-yield securities and interest rates, being a correlation rho of 0.8 between the effects 
of the interest rate scenario and the scenarios for variable-yield securities. Full diversification 
(a correlation of zero) is assumed for all other risk factors. 
 
BPV 
Market-cyclical effects are not taken explicitly into account; however, market risk model is 
updated / recalibrated yearly. 
 
BaFin 
Econometric evidence seems to support the various market efficiency hypotheses. In this 
sense, we do not expect valuation or risk models to make optimistic assumptions of the 
flavour “after three bad years there must come a good year”.   
 
8.5.7 Policyholder behaviour 
 
Policyholder behaviour impacts, amongst others, lapse rates, paid-up rates, exercising of 
options (e.g. guaranteed annuity options) and the timing of claims reporting. 
 
• 7 participants take relations between market (i.e. interest rate) movements and some of 
the aforementioned policyholder behaviour explicitly into account; in particular lapse 
rates. The degree of sophistication varies between full rational behaviour assumptions 
and a mixed formulaic link based on past observations. 
• 5 participants use static best estimate assumptions for the lapse rates, without 
explicitly linking them to market factors. 
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We recommend a sensitivity analysis with respect to changed policyholder behaviour to 
determine those behavioural aspects that should be dynamically modelled as risk drivers. 
 
DNB 
For valuation purposes, policyholder behaviour should be modelled on the basis of the most 
realistic parameters. The insurer should be able to give the assumptions with respect to 
policyholder behaviour a solid ground. 
 
Policyholders behaviour e.g. regarding embedded options should be modelled according to 
most realistic estimations. 
 
BPV 
Policyholder behaviour is taken into account for the valuation of liabilities (for options and 
guarantees) and also for the target capital (sensitivity w.r.t. lapsation and other policyholder 
behaviour is an explicit part of the life model) 
 
BaFin 
Some options like choosing a lump-sum instead of the life annuity are not optimally exercised 
by policy holders. If the variability in the policy holder behaviour materially affects the P&L, 
then it should be considered a risk driver. 
 
8.5.8 Surplus participation  
 
The IAA mentions profit sharing related to actual and/or historical asset returns under market 
risks. They differ between three types of profit sharing 
• Fully based on external objective indicators of the market performance (e.g. a stock 
market index). The company may or may not actually be holding these benchmark 
assets in its portfolio. 
• Linked to the performance of the company’s investments. The management may be 
entitled to declare the bonus rate. 
• Linked to locked-in fund at the policyholder’s discretion, e.g. unit linked products. 
 
All participants take policyholder surplus participation into account, both for valuation and 
risk assessment, to a more or lesser extent. The SST takes a pure policyholder point of view 
and requires only the guaranteed liabilities to be considered.  
 
We recommend that the risk model must recognize the conditional and unconditional profit 
sharing linkages between asset and liability cash flows. See also the DNB comments. 
 
In multi-year risk models, bonus and crediting rates have to be based on the rules that are 
expected to apply in practice, based on the investment results specific to each simulation. 
 
DNB 
With-profits benefits (profit-sharing) can be conditional or unconditional. They are 
distinguished as follows.  
 
A with-profits benefit is unconditional if the amount of the benefit is linked only to an 
objective financial event so that the amount can be ascertained immediately. In modelling the 
cash flows, an institution must take account of the fact that the amount of the benefit depends 
directly for example, on corporate profits, investment yields or objective external returns. An 
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example of such an option is the guarantee of minimum annual returns for with-profits 
insurance. Another example is the right to extend the contract on pre-agreed terms and/or 
rates. Such options may affect the cash flow from an obligation and thus have a value. There 
are customary methods and techniques for the valuation of such unconditional with-profits 
liabilities, such as option valuation techniques.  
 
A with-profits benefit is conditional if its amount is determined wholly or partly by a decision 
of the board. A conditional cash flow for insurers is the profit sharing that depends on a board 
decision on allocating operating profit to policyholders. It is generally specified that there is 
profit sharing but the amount is not certain in advance; usually, of course, there is a link with 
actual investment results. But the relationship between these results, the profit sharing and the 
timing of the allocation is not set out unambiguously.  
 
In order to be able to value these conditional with-profits benefits, the insurer must specify its 
level of ambition. The level of ambition reflects the objectives the institution is aiming for 
with these liabilities to the counterparty. The specified level of ambition is reflected initially 
in the contract between the customer and the insurer. The customer needs to know when and 
to what extent he is entitled to something. The break-down is also a vital management tool 
and important for prudential supervision.  
 
The level of ambition need not be formulated in strict quantitative terms: it may be a 
benchmark or a formula with parameters. The level of ambition must be consistent with: 
contractual terms and conditions; 
expectations created by the insurer (in the policy terms, proposals, brochures or other forms of 
communications); 
the policy as shown from actual conduct (consistent or otherwise). 
 
An ‘en bloc’ clause in the policy terms allows the insurer wide scope to make changes. These 
may affect premiums but also involve changes to the cover. The cash flows arising from these 
clauses must be stated at realistic value under DNB. 
 
The question of whether an insurer can alter the premium income from the existing insurance 
portfolio can play a role in valuing ‘en bloc’ clauses. This cash inflow depends on the policy 
that the insurer applies. It is, therefore, a conditional cash flow. An intention to adjust 
premiums has to be made explicit by the insurer, and allowance must be made for the limited 
ability of increasing premiums in a market. It can then value the associated conditional cash 
flows so that it can also report the difference with normal premiums to DNB. 
 
BPV 
Not taken into account. 
 
BaFin 
Valuation should be consistent with risk modelling.  
 
8.5.9 Management actions 
 
In the multi-year models, management actions are explicitly modelled based on asset returns 
and the overall solvency situation.  E.g. in business units with participating funds, the 
reversionary bonus and or asset mix is reduced by a certain percentage if statutory solvency 
falls below a certain threshold.  
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• 5 participants do not quantitatively assess impacts of management actions, but for 3 of 
them this aspect is being investigated. 2 participants do a separate qualitative 
assessment. 
• 5 participants take account of management actions in the valuation of the insurance 
liabilities which includes projecting cash flows and asset returns. This is achieved 
through limiting bonus cuts by policyholder expectations, or through smoothing cuts 
across time, or a capital charge for the operational risk due to management actions. 
• 3 participants do a full multi-year assessment of the risk inherent in management 
actions. 
 
We recommend that the underlying assumptions in the stochastic simulations are checked for 
reasonableness in extreme situations. However, we expect that statistical back testing is 
usually difficult for the lack of data. 
 
DNB 
For valuation purposes, management actions, other than arising from contractual obligations, 
do not play a role. Management actions, such as risk limits, stop loss limits etc., may be 
included in the internal models method, but not in the standardised method of the FTK 
Solvency Test.  
 
BPV 
Management actions are not taken into account. 
  
8.5.10 Regulatory actions 
 
Regulatory actions, or better restrictions, may become material in connection with fungibility 
of capital, such as mentioned by the BPV below.  
 
• 10 participants do not take regulatory actions into account (yet). 
• 3 participants take account of regulatory actions, for instance in operational risk tests 
in cases such as compliance failures or mis-selling. Or, in a multi-year context, by 
including a regulatory solvency margin in the definition of default in the rules applied 
to determine capital transfers from/to the group. 
  
DNB 
For valuation purposes, regulatory actions, other than arising from contractual obligations, do 
not play a role. 
 
BPV 
Regulatory actions are taken into account at the group level, if group-level diversification 
benefits are to be allocated to legal-entity level target capital.  
 
8.5.11 Tax effects 
 
Tax effects (e.g. tax relieve in extreme loss cases) may be considered as risk reducing factors. 
However, it is doubtable that hypothetical deferred tax assets (in respect of future losses) do 
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have any value in stressed conditions. We recommend that any tax assumption leading to 
material risk reducing effects is carefully validated. 
 
• 11 participants take quantitative account of tax effects in valuation. Mostly using a 
simple flat rate rule. Accurate tax modelling is not thought necessary. At least 3 
participants apply more explicit tax modelling across time. 
• At least 6 participants explicitly mention not to take account of the risk aspect of tax 
effects. 
• 2 participants do not take quantitative account at all, but qualitative, or it is being 
investigated.  
 
DNB 
Tax claims should be valued at realistic value. 
 
BPV 
Tax effects are not taken into account. 
  
8.5.12 Others 
 
From a policyholder point of view, the ability of paying future shareholders dividends is not 
considered to be protected by risk capital. 
 
8.6 Risk mitigation methods  
 
8.6.1 Hedging market and credit risks (dynamic and static strategies) 
 
All participants include static hedging in their models. A typical example in life is holding 
long dated swaptions for a static hedge of guaranteed annuity options. The most frequent 
derivates in use are plain vanilla put and call options on equity and interest rates, futures and 
forward contracts on FX, credit default swaps. No more exotic instruments have been 
mentioned. 
 
Dynamic strategies that involve matching assets to liabilities at infrequent intervals (e.g. 
annual or quarterly rebalancing) could be incorporated into the multi-year risk assessment 
models. However, where the samples that are used to build the strategies are also used to test 
them, there might result an underestimation of the residual hedging risks. 
 
We observed that, usually, only the cash flows of derivatives are taken into account but not 
their the asset values (no “implied volatility” risk is considered as such). 
 
BPV 
Can be introduced via sensitivities or modelling of the risk transfer. 
 
BaFin  
Reinsurance and other methods of risk transfer induce counterparty credit risk.  
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8.6.2 Securitization/ART 
 
• 8 participants mention not to have engaged in securitisations/ARTs, hence there is 
nothing to be modelled. However, half of them claim that this would potentially be 
possible. 
• 4 participants model the effects of securitization/ARTs. 
 
We recommend that the economic benefits of any risk transfer are given credit subject to the 
(counter-party) risks involved. 
 
BPV 
Can be modelled, no prescription, but has to be disclosed. 
 
BaFin 
Reinsurance and other methods of risk transfer induce counterparty credit risk.  
 
8.6.3 Reinsurance 
 
• 11 participants take (passive) reinsurance into account for risk mitigation. 
 
We recommend that the following observations may serve as guideline: 
• Insurance cash flows have to be modelled net and gross of reinsurance to test for the 
credit risk exposure.  
• If no easy netting of local cash flows is possible or meaningful (e.g. if the entire 
reinsurance program is written at group level), then reinsurance can be accounted for 
on the asset side. 
• Large reinsurance programs are modelled explicitly, with appropriate underlying 
stochastic models of the gross losses. Smaller programmes, working layers and 
proportional contracts may be modelled on a coarser basis, but any approach must be 
able to identify the recovery explicitly to allow testing credit risk exposure. 
 
BPV 
Has to be modelled, no prescription but has to be disclosed. 
 
BaFin 
Reinsurance and other methods of risk transfer induce counterparty credit risk.  
 
8.6.4 Default of reinsurance  
 
• 10 participants take quantitatively account of reinsurance default. This is mostly based 
on the internal credit risk model using the credit ratings of the reinsurers.  
• 2 participants do a qualitative assessment only. 
• At least 3 participants claim that reinsurance (default) is not significant for their 
overall portfolio risk. 
 
We recommend that  
• Reinsurance default is correlated with equity markets and catastrophe losses. 
• Reinsurance concentration risk is minimized by diversification. 
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BPV 
Target capital has to be calculated assuming that all reinsurers default. The probability of this 
scenario is given by the default probability of the reinsurer to which most risks are ceded. 
This scenario is then aggregated with the results of the models and the other scenarios. 
 
BaFin 
Reinsurance and other methods of risk transfer induce counterparty credit risk.  
 
8.7 Calibration/Lack of data 
 
Methods to deal with lack of data that have been mentioned include: 
• 8 participants mention: Expert opinion, provided in-house by e.g. geoscientists, senior 
business managers, or externally by reinsurance brokers 
• 4 participants mention: Appropriate model design. Examples: The model is designed 
in such a way, that the missing parameter has a natural interpretation (like tail 
dependency in contrast to linear correlation). Or a reduction of the number of model 
parameters, e.g. by limiting to a unique correlation coefficient for all basic loss 
distributions in non-life. Take published research into account. 
• 2 participants mention: Implicit prudence: use conservative estimates. 
• 7 participants mention: External data pools, such as Fitch F1RST, ORX operational 
loss databases, or ICFRS non-life trend volatility data base, and other (commercial) 
external data provider. 
 
We recommend that anything from actuarial estimates to external data pools, expert 
judgements or special projects to gather the missing data is employed. 
 
BPV 
We accept - and live with – the lack of historical data.  
 
BaFin 
We expect data pools to be used extensively. 
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 9 Aggregation and diversification 
 
Diversification of risk is a statistical fact and the economic basis for the existence of the 
insurance industry. Diversification manifests in the following ways: 
• Statistical diversification – The pooling of many independent individual risks results 
in a low coefficient of variation of the total P&L (ratio of standard deviation and 
expectation). On a larger scale, independent risk types (such as market and technical 
insurance risks) have a statistically compensatory effect on the relative total P&L 
variability. Statistical diversification in a final consequence stems from the fact that 
stochastic factors do, with high probability, not all vary beyond a normal range at the 
same time. This does not mean that such events cannot occur. The degree of certainty 
to which capital shall absorb such events is measured by the confidence level that 
underlies the risk assessment. 
• Compensation of opposite effects – A risk type variation can have an opposite effect 
on different portfolio segments. This is not a statistical effect, but caused by opposite 
portfolio sensitivities. For example, a perfect asset liability matching can immunize 
the portfolio against interest rate movements. 
 
These diversification effects are captured by any reasonable risk measurement method. It is 
known, however, that VaR has some theoretical shortfalls in this regard. 
 
The general principle of diversification ultimately results in less capital being needed to 
support a combination of sufficiently independent risks than it would be needed to support the 
same risks but each on a standalone basis. 
    
As a consequence if diversification is applied to a group with several legal entities, at least 
one legal entity would end up with less capital than if it were capitalised on a standalone 
basis. The regulator of that legal entity may be concerned that in case of distress of that legal 
entity capital may not be transferred from the other entities. Reasons for this could be:  
• Regulatory risk: regulators may prevent capital to be transferred from the legal entities 
under their jurisdiction 
• Unwillingness of the companies management to provide the necessary capital 
injection.  
 
Thus, for diversification to really work at a group level it needs to be ensured that if capital is 
held in several legal entities it will be able to flow freely from one legal entity to the other in 
case of need (fungibility). 
 
9.1 Diversification benefits and their allocation 
 
All participating financial conglomerates take full account of diversification benefits between 
insurance and banking business at group level (even negative correlation has been 
mentioned). 
 
All participants, but (partly) one, measure diversification benefits between their local entities.  
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We recommend that fungibility restrictions are taken into account as realistically as possible. 
The difference between purely economic and realistic diversification benefits has to be made 
explicit. 
 
Systematic risks, such as global market factors, should not lead to cross entity diversification 
benefits. 
 
9.1.1 Allocation methods in use 
 
• With a covariance model, the allocation is either done with proportional method (1 
participant) or marginal method (“Euler scheme”) (4 participants).  
• Other allocation methods in use are: marginal methods in connection with TailVar and 
simple flat percentage discount rules. 
• 5 participants do not allocate diversification benefits to sub-units, but keep them at 
group level. This may lead to a higher group rating than for local entities (mentioned 
by 1 participant). 
 
Both, hierarchical and one-step lowest level to top group level (correlation factors set at 
lowest level, no nested covariance aggregation) aggregation/allocation methods are in use. We 
recommend that further research is done for a better understanding of the pros and cons of 
these aspects. 
 
Here is a pitfall that we have encountered: the capital requirement for an individual risk class 
does not necessarily decrease with increasing level of diversification. For example, consider 
three entities with stand alone required capital of 100 m euro each. The correlation matrix is 
 
1
01
101
 
 
Aggregation of the first two (independent) risk positions and subsequent allocation using the 
marginal method gives 100/√2 = 70.71 m euro diversified capital requirement for entity one. 
The fully diversified capital requirement for entity one however is 200/√5 = 89.44 m euro. 
While the independence of the first two entities leads to a considerable capital relieve, the 
high correlation (could be less than 1, the example still would work) between entity one and 
three results in a higher capital requirement for entity one.  
 
9.1.2 Sub-units considered for diversification  
 
There is a trade-off between diversification of regulatory risk and capital mobility in the 
choice of sub-units: subsidiaries as sub-units allow for a greater variety of regulators (no 
concentration on one “bad” regulator), on the other hand, branches allow for more capital 
mobility. 
 
Throughout, the internal risk analysis is based on business units (operating entities, profit 
centres) and lines of business, which are different from legal entities in general. 
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We recommend that – for the sake of comparability of regulatory and economic capital 
structure – a legal entity compatible diversification allocation model is developed. 
 
BPV 
If a group would not measure diversification effects to the legal entity level, no benefit for 
target capital would be given. The allocation method is not yet fixed and might actually be at 
the discretion of each group. We are exclusively interested in diversification effects from 
group to total legal entity. 
 
BaFin 
The broad picture is that every legal entity in a group that is a bank is subject to the banking 
rules and every entity that is an insurer is subject to insurance rules.  
 
9.2 Fungibility of capital  
 
From the Policy Statement 04/16 of the FSA: 
 
“For many groups the risk assessment function and capital planning will be performed at a 
group level or along business lines rather than legal entity lines. We do not want to discourage 
such an approach as we see considerable benefits in regulatory capital assessments being 
integrated with the management processes used within a business. However, the approach 
must result in an assessment of each firm’s adequate capital level. We stated that we will take 
into account any detailed evidence that demonstrates that diversification has reduced risks, 
though this would depend on transferability of capital within the group and whether any group 
member faces higher risks because of its membership of a group. 
 
In presenting their ICA, firms will have the opportunity to explain how features such as 
parental support and diversification benefits might provide grounds for a lower level of group 
ICG and solo ICG. But lower ICG will only be appropriate if we are satisfied that capital 
would in practice be transferable within the group in conditions of financial stress. We 
consider it unlikely that groups adopting an approach that is based on a group-level capital 
assessment (i.e. assuming full, unrestricted, transferability as if the group were a single legal 
entity operating in a single jurisdiction) and then allocating the result to undertakings would 
be able to satisfy us that the group risks and transferability issues had been adequately 
considered. We expect groups (and firms within groups) to be able to present an assessment 
of the capital that each firm would consider adequate were it not part of the group, against 
which we can evaluate the transferability issues. “ 
 
To take credit for fungibility one has to recognise that, if one business unit is stressed, 
sufficient surplus capital must be available in other business units to cover the deficit, and that 
one can release the capital somehow. In many cases this will be possible via the simple 
payment of dividends and redistribution through high-level legal entities. Where dividend 
payments are restricted, for example because of local regulatory restrictions, rules on 
distributable surplus, etc., then one must demonstrate alternative approaches to releasing 
surplus capital upstream. 
 
• 6 participants use a pure economic view: the primary objective of the internal model is 
to test and demonstrate that from an economic perspective the group is solvent. This is 
carried out without requiring that legal entities hold capital in excess of the existing 
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legal minimum (Solvency I) capital requirement. Arguments supporting a pure 
economic view are: 
o This view is consistent with rating agencies building on consolidated account. 
o To allow for fungibility restrictions could constitute building margins on top of 
margins, and so be overly conservative. 
o In stressed situations there could be a number of ways of releasing shareholder 
value from one business unit to use in another e.g. the sale of business. 
o A coherent view of risks would be distorted by any particularly severe local 
restrictions. 
• At least 3 participants do (or intend to do) a qualitative assessment of fungibility. 
Example: fungibility should be taken into account by a separate, 3-4 year continuity 
test: i.e. cash flow scenarios to be covered by asset portfolio. If this additional test can 
be passed, the group is in good shape. The time horizon 3-4 years corresponds to the 
time a group needs to refinance its business. 
• 6 participants do take quantitative account of fungibility in their internal models. 
Examples: 
o The internal group capital is larger than the added up Solvency I required 
minimum capital requirements for the stand alone legal entities. 
o Where capital is held in a participating (with-profits) fund then it is assumed 
that one can only access a proportion of that capital, being the shareholder 
owned part. 
o Where capital would be subject to a tax charge on realising a profit and 
transferring it, this is taken into account in dynamic cash flow models. 
o The fungibility is taken into account in the form of transferability constraints 
on the available capital, e.g. any ring-fenced estate is excluded from group 
available capital. 
 
We recommend that fungibility of capital is assessed under financial distress situations. This 
should be part of the risk model. Taking only into account the transferability constraints on 
the available capital under normal situations may underestimate the risk of illiquidity. 
 
We observed the following methods on group level to assert that risk capital may flow freely 
between sub-units in case of need: 
• Fungibility/liquidity/cash flow tests are conducted outside and in addition to the 
internal risk model (e.g. by a 3-4 year scenario analysis) 
• The restriction on capital transfers is taken account of by transferability constraints on 
the available capital. 
• Excess capital is transferred to the group every year. It is held at the holding company. 
• Internal risk transfers, reinsurance/retrocession 
• Distinction of core strategic sub-units  
• Parental guarantees 
• Finance Department undertakes detailed planning of all subunits to ensure that their 
capital needs from a regulatory or rating agency perspective can be met via the 
efficient deployment of liquid assets. This is done on a continuous basis.  
 
 
Since fungibility restrictions seem to have never been a practical problem for the participants, 
we recommend that a case study of fungibility issues under financial distress is performed. 
 
BPV 
Fungibility of capital has to be taken into account. We distinguish between two risks:   
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a) Regulatory risk: The risk that regulators from other legal entities might freeze assets (SCR 
or MCR) and the remainder of the group then is in a worse financial situation (fungibility of 
capital). 
b) The risk, that the group might let subgroups (in particular the legal entity in the scope of 
the SST) be sent into run-off.  
We would expect a group to quantify at least both risks. The group can take into account 
guarantees given towards its subgroups. We would expect a group to model its behaviour in a 
rational way, i.e. under the assumption of being able to shed-off parts of its group if the 
situation deteriorates. We would also assume that the model has to take into account the 
behaviour of regulators in different legal entities. This means in particular that the group level 
model needs to be able to model the relevant legal entities (e.g. US, European, Swiss 
business). 
 
The group needs to show that it has guarantees between the sub-units and that the regulators 
would allow the flow of capital. But this has to be modelled either via scenarios or 
stochastically; the simple assumption of perfect fungibility would not be acceptable for the 
SST. 
 
9.2.1 Rating agencies’ restrictions  
 
• 9 participants do not, currently, take rating agencies’ restrictions on capital 
transferability into account. Reasons that have been mentioned are: 
o Simplicity: Believe that rating agency capital models are limited in scope and 
overly simplistic.  
o Complexity:  
? Testing capital adequacy by rating agency standards at each point of the 
simulation could quickly become a difficult task. 
? It is not possible to steer a business by managing all different rating 
agencies’ constraints. 
o S&P’s, Moody’s and other rating agencies’ models do not yield fundamentally 
different results than the internal group capital models: 
? Ratings are based on the group solvency. 
? Rating agencies make comparable fungibility assumption by taking 
consolidated accounts as the basis for their models. 
• 4 participants do take rating agencies’ restrictions on capital transferability into 
account. Examples: 
o Finance Department undertakes detailed planning of all subunits to ensure that 
their capital needs from a regulatory or rating agency perspective can be met 
via the efficient deployment of liquid assets. This is done on a continuous 
basis. 
o Each business unit has to be capitalized to meet rating agency’s requirements. 
o Transferability constraints for determining group available capital. 
 
We recommend that for realistic risk modelling, rating agencies’ restrictions should be taken 
account of. 
 
BPV 
We would expect a group to be able to model the effect of down-ratings in case of capital 
transfers. 
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9.2.2 Regulatory restrictions  
 
There are mild regulatory restrictions on capital transferability for reinsurers at this time. In 
case there is one group regulator, fungibility of capital is achieved via active capital 
management and internal retrocession. Lack of capital mobility does not impose a barrier to 
diversification benefits if the financial resources can be made available to back policyholder 
and other creditors’ claims as they fall due. 
 
• 7 participants do not, currently, take into account regulatory restrictions on capital 
transferability (this includes the reinsurers). Reasons for not doing so are: 
o Regulators shall adopt the view of shareholders and management: group is 
seen as one single entity 
o It is complex when part of a group falls under another regulator, in particular 
outside of the Solvency II regime. This is still under discussion, also in 
CEIOPS. 
o Inconsistency of business and legal structure: Ideal would be a view on the 
business that is acceptable for regulators and usable for internal steering. For 
instance, a regulator should concentrate on all the business written in his 
country. The overall Group risk supervision should be done by a lead 
supervisor. 
• 6 participants do (partially) take into account regulatory restrictions on capital 
transferability. Examples: 
o Model specified solvency rules that steer the flow of capital, such as maximal 
annual transactions limited by 3% of total asset value, or minimum stand alone 
capital requirements. 
o Holding excess capital at the group for imperfect mobility due to regulatory 
restrictions. 
o Modelling of the shareholder’s fund and dividend distribution policy. 
o Transferability constraints for determining group available capital. 
o No diversification benefits between legal entities. 
 
We recommend that on the regulator side minimum capital requirements (MCR) for legal 
entities are formulated. Stand alone SCR can be funded by contingent capital notes (special 
contracts/instruments to capitalize legal entities) from the group. This requires further studies 
for the valuation of such contingent capital notes. 
 
BPV 
The fact that there is a lead supervisor alone does not guarantee at all that other regulators 
would not restrict capital flows. Of course, if the lead regulator can show legal agreements 
between regulators of different jurisdictions of allowing free capital flow, then these can be 
used in the model. 
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 10 Risk measurement 
 
We can classify the risk measurement methods in use by  
 
Time horizon 
• one year:  
o value changes and cash flows are modelled over one year  
o value changes are instantaneous, size of changes is calibrated to one year 
confidence level, cash flows are disregarded (“shocking the balance sheet”) 
• multi-year: value changes, cash flows and balance sheets are modelled over a multiple 
of years (25 to 30 years), e.g. until insurance liabilities have run off 
 
Risk measure  
• VaR or TailVaR of discounted P&L: the deviation of discounted future realized from 
current net values of the liabilities and backing assets is measured. This may or may 
not include discounted cash flows. The objective is to assert that assets exceed 
liabilities (including a risk margin to allow for continuation of the business in the one-
year assessment) at the end of the period. In a multi-year assessment, recursive 
procedures to take account of inter-temporal insolvencies are included (e.g. if future 
asset values fall below a minimum statutory value then recapitalization is simulated). 
Discounting of future (and terminal) values is done by the realized asset portfolio 
returns. The measurement yields the value of the minimal acceptable backing assets. 
• VaR or TailVaR of deviation of future realized from expected value: the realized 
nominal values are subtracted from the expected nominal values. No discounting 
necessary. The objective is to absorb potential downside deviations from the expected 
result with some certainty. However, this method disregards the risk inherent in losses 
relative to the current values. It replaces the actual current values with the expected 
future values. 
• Target ruin probability: based on dynamic stochastic simulation. The minimal required 
initial assets backing the liabilities are determined in a recursive procedure such that 
inter-temporal default happens for a target percentage of paths (e.g. 4%). The required 
capital is the value of the minimal acceptable backing assets. Cash flows are 
discounted path-wise by the randomly generated future asset returns, usually not risk-
free. Risk-free discounting of cash flows applies to (future) liability valuation, though. 
The objective is to exclude intermediate or terminal insolvency with some probability. 
 
A remarkable combination of the above components (multi-year, VaR) is the risk 
measurement based on two consecutive 99% VaR losses.  
 
Another combination of these basic components is to assess the asset risk on a one year time 
horizon and the insurance liabilities until run-off. That is, the value of insurance liabilities at 
the end of year one is replaced by the ultimate claim size. 
 
It seems to become an industry standard to calibrate target confidence levels to annualized 
VaR. That does not mean, in our opinion, that VaR shall be the ultimate risk measure. 
However, we recommend that the internal risk models produce aggregate P&L probability 
distributions, so that their risk measurement can easily be benchmarked with the standard 
annualized VaR.  
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Pros and cons for multi-year risk measurement: 
Pros:  
• It is virtually the only feasible way to model complicated financial processes on a cash 
flow basis. 
• Provides deeper understanding regarding dynamic risk exposures, measurement of 
embedded risks and their corresponding processes 
• Allows for a high degree of detail including analysis of the reinsurance program, 
business cycles, regime changes and other inter-temporal aspects. 
Cons: 
• Difficult to adjust the confidence level to a rating agency’s target level (e.g. 99.96% 
VaR for a AA Moody’s rating) 
• Error propagation: the result is very sensitive towards model assumptions, in particular 
on anticipated management actions 
• Number of parameters and risk factors to be modelled may contribute significant 
amount of process and parameter risk: bigger and more complex is not necessarily 
better. 
 
We recommend that non-transparent “black box” models are avoided. Simpler and smaller 
models tend to be more in line with basic intuition, making it easier to asses and understand 
the impact of specific variables. 
 
A VaR (or TailVaR) measurement of the P&L distribution gives the maximum possible (or to 
be expected) loss in value of the initial portfolio within the chosen confidence range and time 
interval. This implies that the required capital becomes larger if extra assets are added to the 
initial portfolio, which seems counter-intuitive if required capital is considered for 
policyholder protection only. But this fact is inherent in any monetary (value-based) risk 
measurement.  
 
The IAA recommends that “backing assets”, those assets which are supporting the liabilities’ 
requirements, are distinguished from those assets which are “free assets”. Regulatory required 
capital in turn need not be determined for free assets. However, changing this allocation will 
change the required capital. It is therefore a vital aspect of the risk management process to 
identify explicitly and consistently which assets are required and which are free. We 
recommend that in any case, required capital is always report with respect to the 
corresponding available capital, which obviously is the value of the backing assets chosen. 
 
The target ruin probability approach determines the minimum required assets backing the 
liabilities in a recursive stochastic procedure. This procedure may be implemented in such a 
way that it directly results in an allocation of required and free assets. Therefore, the target 
ruin probability approach for a one-year time horizon is different from a VaR measurement in 
general. An alternative may be a scaling of the initial asset composition such that the target 
ruin probability is met. We recommend that the regulator is informed in detail about such 
aspects. 
 
10.1 Confidence level 
 
The range of internal annualized VaR calibrated confidence levels at group level range from 
99.6% to beyond 99.99% (in brackets the number of participants): 
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99.6% (1), 99.75% (1), 99.8% (1), 99.9% (1), 99.95% (2), 99.97% (3), 99.98% (1), beyond 
99.99% (1) 
 
The remaining 2 participants do not calibrate their confidence level to an annualized VaR at 
this time. 
 
• All of the 8 participants within the confidence range of 99.8% to 99.98% claim to aim 
at an “AA” rating. Apparently, these confidence levels are not the only factor driving 
the rating. 
• 3 participants do not link their confidence level to a rating agency or regulatory 
requirement. 
 
DNB    
See comments  in Section 6.4. 
 
BPV 
99% expected shortfall, fully in-line with regulatory requirements 
 
BaFin 
We expect regulatory capital requirements (SCR) to be lower than own economic capital 
requirements, except for ailing insurers.  
 
10.2 Time horizon  
 
Different time horizons have traditionally been applied to different risk measures (e.g. 10 days 
for market risks versus one- or multi-years for credit and insurance risks). 
 
Research results of some participants suggest that there is value in risk modelling beyond one 
year (in order to capture long-term economic risks) but that a full run-off projection may not 
be required. On the other hand, it was mentioned two participants that they found that their 
multi-year total asset method tended to underestimate the required capital or the ruin risk 
within the observation period, respectively. 
 
We recommend that more research is done to assess the trade-off between the modelling error 
of a multi-year assessment and the potential underestimation of risk on a one-year time 
horizon.  
 
• 9 participants use a one-year modelling time horizon for the risk measurement 
• 3 participants use a multi-year modelling time horizon for the risk measurement (25 to 
30 years) 
• 1 participant uses a mixture (one year for market risks, run-off/ultimate claim size for 
insurance risks) 
 
The calibration of an annualized confidence level to multiple years is done by a power rule. 
Example: if 99.5% is the annualized confidence level, then 99.5%^10 ≈ 100% - 10·0.5% = 
95% is the confidence level on a 10 year time horizon (may be risk exposure duration based).  
 
In some cases shorter time horizons (e.g. 10 days for market risks in banking) are extrapolated 
to one-year by using the square root of time method (e.g. scaling the VaR by √(250/10) = 5.) 
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We recommend that further research is done to assess the quality of the various scaling rules 
in use. 
 
The one-year time horizon seems to represent a reasonable convention, striking a balance 
between robustness in risk measurement and the average time required to manage a portfolio 
of risk exposures. However, the emergence of the one-year horizon as the industry standard 
does imply that a one-year horizon should also be used in addressing issues such as product 
pricing, credit provisioning, risk monitoring or limit setting. 
 
Note that annual changes of market factors may have a long term effect of valuation (e.g. 
interest rate shock has dramatic effect in long-tail business). 
 
We recommend that, for one-year risk measurements, an explicit risk margin is included to 
assert the continuation of business after a one-year financial distress. This risk margin should 
be calibrated such that it accounts for the cost of capital to run off the liabilities in a going 
concern context. Example: SST risk margin. 
 
DNB 
See comments in section 6.4. 
 
BPV 
1 year 
 
BaFin 
1 year 
 
10.3 Risk measures  
 
To assess their initially required capital 
 
• 9 participants use VaR as basic risk measure, 
• 2 participants use TailVaR as basic risk measure, 
• 2 participant use a target default probability. 
 
Combinations of disparate risk measures are in use. Often TailVaR is used in the covariance 
model for heavy tailed insurance risks such as catastrophes for reinsurance.  
 
Arguments for VaR 
• the tail of the distribution is difficult to determine in practice and TailVaR is more 
sensitive with respect to the analytical tail modelling assumptions than VaR 
• easy to communicate to management 
 
Arguments for TailVaR 
• coherent risk measure, no shortfalls with aggregation  
• captures potential losses beyond VaR 
 
Arguments for target ruin probability 
• is based on the aggregate distribution of future values and cash flows 
 
 
 83
DNB 
There exists a difference between the standard approach and the internal model approach. 
Within the standard approach the practical arguments should be leading, while in an internal 
model also the more complicated elements should be addressed. This leads to a preference for 
the VaR like risk measure within the standard approach and in an internal model the TailVaR 
will be the more appropriate risk measure. 
 
BPV 
Expected shortfall is used. 
 
BaFin 
The model is about distributions, not risk numbers. Risk limits, monitoring and reporting may 
be based directly on exposure data (i.e. scenario vectors and sensitivities) or different 
parameters of the distributional forecast provided by the model (like VaR and standard 
deviation).   
 
10.3.1 Aggregation of risk measurements  
 
As to how the different risk measurements in use are aggregated, 
 
• 6 participants derive an aggregated P&L distribution (e.g. aggregated cash flow 
distribution at group level) and then apply a risk measure 
• 6 participants aggregate stand alone risk numbers (using e.g. the covariance method) 
 
At least 2 participants use a combination of the two. 
 
We recommend that the focus of the risk modelling is more on aggregate distributions than on 
risk numbers. This allows for more flexibility in the assessment, allows for better 
communication with externals and provides superior information to e.g. regulators and rating 
agencies.   
 
BPV 
It is determined at the end of the calculation. The only exception is credit risk which has to be 
added at the end of the calculation.    
 
BaFin 
See section 4 in the White Paper.  
 
10.3.2 Pitfalls of the covariance method and VaR in general 
 
In the bottom-up covariance model the first step is to calculate stand alone required capitals 
by risk type and/or business units. Diversification benefits are often explained by the 
statistical fact that “not all the worst case scenarios will happen at the same time”.  
 
This argumentation disregards the risk that arises from the sheer combinations of potential 
losses per risk type beyond worst case. Indeed, adding up different positions may increase the 
probability of material losses. It is well known that VaR, which underlies the covariance 
approach, does not capture this effect appropriately. We shall illustrate this with a simple 
example: suppose two independent risky positions X and Y, each bearing the possibility of a 
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loss of 1 bn with probability 0.03%. The maximal possible gains of both X and Y are assumed 
to be 100 m each. The 99.95%-VaR of both X and Y is 400 m. That is, the 99.95%-VaR does 
not capture the possible losses of 1 bn on a stand alone basis. However, adding the two 
positions, X+Y bears now the possibility of a loss of at least 1 bn – 0.1 bn = 0.9 bn with 
probability 2·0.03% = 0.06%. The 99.95%-VaR of X+Y is thus at least 0.9 bn, which is even 
greater than the sum (that is, even after disregarding all diversification benefits) of the stand 
alone capitals of X and Y. 
  
This pitfall can be overcome by either applying a coherent risk measure, such as TailVaR, or 
by aggregating distributions instead of numbers.  
  
TailVaR of X+Y is always captured by the sum of the stand-alone TailVaRs of X and Y. 
However, TailVaR of X is very sensitive towards the shape of the full tail of the distribution 
of X, which causes serious statistical problems when it comes to estimating this tail (McNeil 
AJ and Saladin T: The peaks over thresholds method for estimating high quantiles of loss 
distributions. Proceedings of 28th International ASTIN Colloquium). In the extreme case, 
TailVaR of X may depend on the statistical modelling assumptions rather than on the 
empirical data underlying X. 
  
We acknowledge the practical aspects of the covariance approach. However, we recommend 
that the entire information which is included in the distributions of the stand-alone risk types 
and/or business units is carried forward by aggregating distributions (numerically or 
analytically) rather than aggregating risk numbers. If the statistical characteristics of any 
stand-alone or the aggregate distribution points towards the above mentioned difficulties (e.g. 
is fat-tailed, skewed, etc), then a more sophisticated capital aggregation procedure is 
advisable. This applies to group capital assessment in particular. Research of some 
participants shows that e.g. for natural catastrophes the deviation from the “true” overall risk 
capital and the covariance aggregated VaR numbers is significant. We recommend that – at 
least partially – an aggregation model based on frequency/severity or scenario modelling is 
used for such risk types. 
 
A practical solution could be to use simplified covariance formulas on low levels, and more 
sophisticated methods on higher levels (e.g. use TailVaR instead of VaR or aggregate 
distributions instead of numbers). 
 
10.4 Mathematical implementation 
 
The following methods have been mentioned: 
 
Analytic approximation (e.g. normal distributions, covariance aggregation) 
• Basis for the covariance model: the risk factors are assumed to be jointly normal 
distributed. The stand alone required capitals are then summed using covariance 
aggregation 
• Also used for valuation in life insurance: e.g. group life, proxy formulas for embedded 
options 
 
Monte Carlo simulation  
• Globally integrated Monte Carlo simulation for the multi-year risk assessment: 
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o each sub-unit runs a Monte Carlo simulation, conditional on the centrally 
generated economic sample paths, to output the cash flows for the unit 
considered 
o the cash flows can then be aggregated at group level and risk measurement be 
performed on cash flows (at all levels). 
• Also used to value complex embedded derivatives and guarantees that cannot be 
valued with closed form solutions  
 
Numerical aggregation of discretised distributions 
• Non-normal non-life loss distributions (mainly large and catastrophic losses) are 
numerically aggregated  
• Hierarchical dependence structure: simulated distributions of sub-units taken as input 
marginal distributions for next level, choice of copula and MC simulation to derive 
numerical distribution on this level, etc.  
 
Others: historical simulation – historical VaR of certain risk types (market risks) is directly 
derived from time series. 
 
Analytical approximations and Monte Carlo simulations are the major mathematical 
techniques in use (mentioned explicitly by 10 participants), followed by other numerical 
aggregation methods for discretised distributions (4 participants).  
 
DNB 
The principle in this is that DNB does not prescribe a technique, but checks that every 
institution applies relevant methods that are widely recognised internationally. 
 
BPV 
It can be implemented in whatever way a company finds suitable. Parts of the calculation are 
done on a spreadsheet which has to be used by all companies 
 
BaFin 
There should be no limits on methodologies, just statistical quality criteria that weed out 
substandard techniques 
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 11 Risk steering and capital allocation 
 
11.1 Structures for allocation of risk capital 
 
There is a great variety of group structures, and different objectives call for different 
structures. E.g. regulatory capital requirements require legal entity (or country entity) scheme. 
Performance measurement requires business unit (or line of business) allocation scheme. 
Internal models should be able to combine these various aspects consistently for the approval 
of the results by the regulators  
 
The risk capital allocation is done according to the business structures of the groups. 
Deviations between legal and business structure are possible in both ways (business units may 
include several legal entities and a business unit might be spread over different legal entities). 
Ideal would be a view on the business that is acceptable for regulators and usable for internal 
steering. 
 
The smallest entities that are mentioned are individual contracts (for premium risk). This is 
not typical, though. The predominant granularity for allocation is given by geographic 
markets and lines of business. Main obstacle for high granularity is data availability. 
 
On the banking side, Basel II requests a drill down of the total required capital to country 
legal entity, which amounts to a downscaling in terms of size. 
 
We recommend that a legal entity version of the internal model and its interplay with business 
entity version is developed. A workable compromise may be a segmentation by countries (see 
remark BPV), since this view would allow a regulator to concentrate on all the business 
written in his country (there are exceptions, e.g. for reinsurers the business structure – with 
specialised lines of business such as natural perils – is less geographically localized as for 
retail insurance). Some participants already do so, and others mention that it is simple to 
obtain legal entity capital allocation from internal results, since their business units are almost 
identical to legal entities. 
 
BPV 
The SST takes a legal entity view. However we would also expect breakdown to country 
level. Further breakdown of target capital is not necessary for supervisory purposes 
 
BaFin 
See section 7 of the White Paper.    
 
11.2 Allocation of risk taking capacities 
 
The implemented risk capital allocation method (e.g. marginal contribution, see Section 9.1.1) 
provides information about the risk contribution of a sub-unit to the overall risk. A capital 
adequacy target ratio for the allocated risk capital and the local available capital may suggest 
the capacity for risk with respect to the overall risk tolerance. 
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However, the majority of the participants are not in the position of using their internal model 
in isolation for allocation of risk taking capacity. In practice, the risk taking capacity is limited 
by different solvency criteria: economic, rating and regulatory. Local regulatory and rating 
agency views of capital are important (“It is our intention that an economic view of risk 
capital becomes the norm for external monitoring as well as our internal approach. However, 
in the short-term we have to recognise that local regulatory and rating agency views of capital 
are important”).  
 
Setting risk taking capacities is a strategic function of the group risk appetite, taking into 
account the sub-unit’s existing risk profiles and strategic growth plans (“It is intended that 
overall risk limits be set within the group’s risk appetite. Internal consolidated review 
processes ensure that aggregate risk levels remain within overall tolerances.”). E.g. value-
based management includes prioritization of available capital. Overall risk tolerance is merely 
a benchmark for the aggregate risk capacity limit. (“Risk taking capacity is only roughly 
linked to overall risk tolerance. It is rather linked to the goal to create a “balanced” well-
diversified portfolio and the avoidance of risk concentrations.”) 
 
There is an important difference between top-down models build only at group level and ones 
which take input from bottom-up models build within the business units. The risk features can 
vary significantly for the local products or markets. This is partly due to culture and local 
demand but also to variations in local tax laws, business conduct, regulation and contract 
laws. Therefore, a group wide model will need to take into account the thoroughness of the 
bottom-up approach if it is to be used for risk appetite decisions rather then just high level 
capital allocation and performance measurement.  
 
There is no clear trend as to whether diversification benefits should be taken into account for 
the allocation of risk taking capacities. At least 5 participants allocate diversification benefits 
from group to sub-units, either in full or where appropriate. At least 2 participants do not at all 
take diversification benefits into account (“We are trying to limit any one risk from a 
concentration and discipline perspective.  Risk policies drive diversification and not the other 
way around.”) 
 
BPV 
There is only allocation of risk capital from group to legal-entity possible. However, stand-
alone calculation has always to be done 
 
BaFin 
See section 7 of the White Paper.    
 
11.3 Allocation of risk capital costs  
 
We have not observed major differences between the business structures for risk taking 
capacity and capital cost allocation. Business unit management may break down the group 
allocated risk capital to smaller units according to local keys (local diversification benefits 
may or may not be allocated). 
 
The allocation keys in use are marginal contribution methods (Euler principle, covariance 
method). As for the cost of capital there is no trend, some use fully diversified allocated risk 
capital and a fixed rate for cost of capital, others take local factors (such as management 
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ability, market conditions, local solvency requirements, stand alone risk capital etc.) into 
account.  
 
As described in Section 3.2 “Areas of application of internal models”, 4 participants do not 
use their internal model for performance measurement at this time (but they intend to do so). 
 
BPV 
Granularity: legal entities. The allocation method is not yet fixed, but perhaps can be left to 
the companies as long as the allocation is done consistently. 
 
BaFin 
See section 7 of the White Paper.    
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 12 Model implementation and infrastructure 
 
In a draft outline of a Solvency II Framework directive (Annex to document 
MARKT/2507/05) the following commission staff proposal to Article N2 (Internal Control 
and Administrative Organisation) can be found: 
 
“The Home Member State shall require every insurance undertaking to have robust 
governance arrangements, which include a clear organisational structure with well defined, 
transparent and consistent lines of responsibility, and to have internal control mechanisms. 
The internal control mechanisms should be adequate for the nature and scale of the insurance 
undertaking’s business and should include sound administrative and accounting  procedures.” 
 
And from the IAA WP report we quote: 
 
“The insurer must demonstrate that the internal model operates within a risk management 
environment that is conceptually sound and supported by adequate resources. It also needs to 
be supported by appropriate audit and compliance procedures. …There should be clear lines 
of responsibilities and reporting and the company should have well-established and articulated 
operating rules and procedures.” 
 
From this, we see that model implementation and infrastructure will be a big issue for the 
regulators which are likely to prefer a partial model with methodological drawbacks but 
which is truly embedded in the management process showing a clear model implementation 
and infrastructure to a perhaps technically refined “window model”. We found that it is also a 
big issue for the companies, very demanding with respect to human resources and still a broad 
field for improvement. Since it typically varies very much across the participants, it is not 
easy giving overall proposals but we would like to point out some guidelines here. For 
Solvency II purposes, we think it is important to 
• perform a regular (we propose at least a half-year) assessment (where back-testing 
should be compulsory) 
• have the internal model continually developed (also methodologically) 
• have a detailed documentation available on different levels (for the actuaries, the 
CRO, etc. if necessary) including risk management responsibilities and organizational 
structures. 
• have a public disclosure of the methodology e.g. at seminars or conferences (this is not 
to be compulsory, but desirable) 
• strengthen the independent risk management unit 
• have a transparent IT reporting system established involving the senior management 
showing clear lines of responsibilities 
• successfully deal with data and data management problems. 
 
The overall aim is to establish an open and transparent risk culture on which basis the internal 
model can continually be discussed within the company as well as with the regulators 
 
With some questions we like to include in addition some excerpts from the SPECIFIC CALL 
FOR ADVICE FROM CEIOPS: REQUEST N° 1 (14 July 2004), the IAA and the FTK 
document. 
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12.1 Model Assessment 
12.1.1 Frequency and methods 
 
All participants assess their internal models on a regular basis; more than half of the 
participants perform a half yearly or yearly assessment;  
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The internal model is in particular assessed when the risk-capital calculations are done (run of 
the model = assessment); most participants perform extra assessments e.g. according to 
review plans or when new input-information becomes available. 
 
Internal model assessment (by (order of) the companies): 
When being accepted for usage, a model should be subject to back testing to ensure that its 
capabilities remain subject to the original specification and the model is performing as 
expected (this process should be carried out by persons independent of the day usage of the 
model to ensure the integrity of the validation process). 
Only a small number of the participants confirmed performing back testing; reasons for not 
doing so are: 
o Not possible since extreme events are involved 
o Very difficult over an annual time horizon 
o No satisfactory method of back testing established yet 
o Model still under development 
o Not enough data available. 
 
Other methods for assessment mentioned were: onsite visits, technical reviews, external 
consultants. Also stress testing was given an explicit mentioning (by only some of the 
participants; however, at least half of the participants perform some sort of stress tests, if only 
to some smaller extent or on special sub-units). 
 
External model assessment: 
For the participants the external audit role still needs to be clarified. One opinion mentioned 
was that external auditors are best placed to opine on inputs to the model and to calculation 
processes where these are linked to the areas already covered by external audit, while the task 
 91
of doing model assumption and output validation would be best subjected to some form of 
independent (rather than external) assurance (see also Section 12.1.3, External reviews). 
Some participants expressed the idea that the audit role of the regulators should comprise a 
stay with the company for a longer period (up to 3 months) to understand the working of the 
model where stress testing is expected to be performed! 
 
We would suggest a half yearly assessment together with some stress and back testing. Some 
sort of check list for the assessment (perhaps supported by the regulators) could be useful. 
Stress testing results should be included into model validation procedures. 
 
CEIOPS 
Stress testing is regularly conducted, including both scenarios and sensitivity tests. 
 
BaFin 
We expect quarterly P&L attribution (“back testing”) and ongoing sensitivity analyses. 
 
IAA  
Stress testing is a supplement to risk management. It does not replace a capital requirement 
but complements it. In a number of implementations, the object of the exercise is to verify 
that the company will be able to satisfy its regulatory capital requirements under a variety of 
future adverse scenarios. 
 
12.1.2  Model documentation 
 
Here   
• 9 participants affirmed that a detailed documentation of the internal model exists 
• 4 participants answered with “yes, but…” 
 
The “buts” were… 
• the documentation has been created over the years without guidance nor standards 
given, it is not suitable for distribution 
• the documentation is available (to different extent) only at sub-unit level. 
 
Nearly all participants seek for (or already have available) a complete and unified 
documentation of their internal model, including also risk management responsibilities and 
organizational structures. This is vital for the regulatory review process. 
 
FTK 
The documentation of the internal model must give detailed information on the theoretical 
basis of the models and the empirical evidence. The institution must describe which risks and 
activities do and do not form part of the internal models. The documentation must contain an 
analysis of the risk mitigating measures taken. The institution must set out its policy on the 
use of hedges, guarantees, collateral and derivatives as risk-mitigating instruments. It must 
also document the process of statistically validating the results of the internal model. The 
documentation provides information on the stress testing process and contains an indication of 
the circumstances in which the models are not sufficiently reliable. 
 
BaFin 
Model documentation is required. 
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12.1.3 External reviews 
 
Here 
• 7 participants have already had their internal model reviewed externally, 3 of them by 
a consulting firm 
• 6 participants have had no external review yet; however, 3 of them are planning to 
have one. 
 We recommend that an independent review of the model (validation and reconciliation of the 
data, calculations to check for compliance with the documented methodology, etc.) should be 
carried out on a regular basis thus increasing the trust and the confidence of the regulators in 
the integrated internal model. This external review has to be carried out by an independent, 
competent 3rd party (e.g. a consultant, university, different auditors, etc.), thus substituting and 
complementing the regulatory review at regulator’s discretion, e.g. if the regulator does not 
have the recourses to support such a review. 
 
BaFin 
Examination by the supervisor will be prerequisite for the use of the model for regulatory 
purposes. 
 
IAA:  
Independent peer review of a company actuary’s work (by an experienced reviewer) has been 
found in some jurisdictions to increase the quality of that work as well as the supervisor’s 
confidence in the company’s result. … The periodic actuarial peer reviews act in concert with 
capital requirements to enhance the protection of policyholders. 
 
12.1.4 Publication and presentations 
 
Here 
• 7 of the participants had their internal methodology published in expert-reviewed 
journals or presented at conferences. 
• 6 of the participants have not had it reviewed or presented yet (4 of them only partially 
or on a very high level). 
 
It is interesting to note that the answers to this and the preceding section are highly correlated: 
6 of the 7 participants who had their internal model reviewed externally have also had their 
underlying methodology published or presented. 
Publications and presentations of the methodology at seminars or conferences will not be 
compulsory, but still should be encouraged. 
 
BaFin 
A publication of the methodology of the integrated internal model in expert-reviewed journals 
or a presentation at conferences is not required.  
 
12.2 Processes 
 
According to the IAA principles, internal models should be accepted by the regulators only if 
they can prove that approximate risk management processes and reporting is in place. 
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Some jurisdictions (e.g. Swiss, Dutch) explicitly state that an internal model will only be 
accepted if accepted if the company can provide sufficient evidence that these models are 
actively used in the internal risk management processes and reporting. 
Thus an independent risk management unit and proper and appropriate reporting lines up to 
the senior management are VITAL for the regulatory process. 
  
12.2.1 Risk management unit 
 
As a model is developed it should be subject to independent checks and challenges to provide 
senior risk management (and supervisors) with some comfort that a review, independent of 
those responsible for the use of the model or its development has been carried out. This may 
be performed by either the internal or external audit function, or if it is sufficiently 
independent, the risk analysis and assessment department.  
 
We have observed that an independent risk management unit exists with (nearly) all of the 
participants, where independence is understood in the sense of having no business 
responsibility. The main tasks and responsibilities of the risk management unit were described 
as     
• being responsible for the design, implementation and development of the risk model 
• setting up parameters, scenarios etc. for the sub-units 
• performing tests on the model 
• supervising the performance of the risk model in the sub-units 
• collecting data from the sub-units 
• aggregation work 
• reporting duties. 
 
The majority of the participants considered the collection of the sub-units’ data, including 
data validation, concern for data quality, different data formats and IT platforms etc. the most 
challenging and time consuming part of their work, together with the tough timelines for 
presenting risk numbers set by the management board. It were only a few participants who did 
not complain about this. 
 
The size of the risk management units varies among the participants and is not necessarily 
related to the size of the company but more to its “philosophy” and its organisational 
structure. We have witnessed risk management units consisting of less than a handful people 
up to groups of 30 people or more. Considering the tasks that are set up for them also by the 
regulators we would suggest that the risk management unit should include members 
responsible for risk management in the sub-units, for model improvement, and for reporting 
and testing purposes plus a CRO. 
 
In this study we concentrated on the central (integrated) risk management unit which is 
located between the company’s sub-units and the company’s management board. In most 
cases the management board is backing up and supporting the risk management unit. In many 
cases the greater problem is bringing the risk management unit’s ideas down to the sub-units. 
 
As a rule, we have not observed separate internal risk controlling units, beside the risk 
management units, among the participants; we  believe it could  be done by the company’s 
independent risk management unit in accordance to the company’s management being 
actively involved in the risk controlling procedure and acting as a “final control instance”. 
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CEIOPS 
Strict separation between risk management and risk controlling.  
 
FTK 
The institution must have an independent risk management function, responsible for the 
design, implementation and maintenance of the institution’s internal model. The staff 
responsible for this work must be independent of the commercial activities and report directly 
to the institution’s senior management. These staff must critically review whether the models 
in use are sufficiently comprehensive, accurate and prudent. They initiate improvements in 
the model as necessary. They must include new activities and products in the risk analyses 
promptly and adequately. They also ensure that there is an independent assessment of all 
processes with a material effect on the model improvement, partly by regularly comparing the 
model results against new internal and external information on the modelled risks. 
 
BaFin 
An independent risk management unit is expected. 
 
IAA 
The insurer should have an independent internal risk management unit, responsible for the 
design and implementation of the risk-based capital model. 
 
12.2.2 Involvement of management in the risk controlling procedure 
 
The senior management should be responsible for the modelling process – from the initial 
development, to its practical daily use, and to its verification and any modification or 
development of the model. It is not regarded as sufficient to leave the subject to “back room 
technicians”.  (Annex 2 to MARKT/2515/02)    
 
The involvement of the company’s management in the risk controlling procedure is an 
important issue in the regulatory process. Although some of the answers to the questionnaire 
have been somehow vague (“The company management has an appropriate level of 
awareness of risk and risk management”), for all participants the management plays an active 
role concerning risk controlling: managements take key strategic and financial decisions 
having regard to the economic, regulatory and rating agency perspectives on the basis of risk 
management reports. Reporting to senior management is standard for all participants. More 
than half (at least 7) of the participants have established processes and institutions for risk 
reporting and discussion, e.g. committees (“risk management committee”, “ALM committee”) 
with members from both the risk and the senior management side in it with regular (up to 
monthly) meetings.  
 
It might be interesting to get an analysis on the following topics: 
 
Degree of involvement:       -    risk numbers reported or discussed 
- risk methodology reported or discussed 
(especially operational risks) 
                                             -    model checks and tests (stress testing) reported 
Methods of involvement:     -    reports 
- committees with regular meetings 
- members of risk management unit in the board. 
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We recommend that the reporting methods are well documented and that stress testing results 
should be included as part of regular management reporting (as suggested in Annex 3 to 
MARKT/2515/02). 
 
CEIOPS    
Reporting to management is comprehensive and adequate. 
 
BaFin 
The management is involved by translating the business strategy into risk limits and 
compensation schemes on the one hand and receiving regular risk reports and responding to 
limit breaches on the other hand. 
 
IAA 
The insurer’s Board and senior management should be actively involved in the risk control 
process, which should be demonstrated as the key aspect of business management. 
 
12.2.3 Formal sign-off process for models and developments 
 
Once developed models rarely remain unchanged, but are subject to regular refinement and 
development.  This process needs to be subject to senior management and regulatory review 
and to stringent controls. As a consequence we have to distinguish between an internal sign-
off process and a sign-off by the regulators. The later will distinguish between amendments 
that will be accepted as a normal part of the model and changes that will be treated as so 
fundamental that the model must be reviewed again as though it were a new application for 
model recognition. An established and well documented internal sign-off process might help 
increasing the confidence of the regulators in the model. 
 
We observed that 
 
• 7 participants have a formal sign-off process for their model (some of them by a 
committee, some have one appointed person doing the sign-off). 
• 2 participants have a partially formalized sign-off process (in some major businesses 
only). 
• 3 participants mentioned no formal sign-off process; but there is still some sign-off 
process going on, either only locally or informally by discussions. 
 
We recommend that a formal sign-off process is considered important as it helps to clarify the 
internal risk management structures. 
 
BaFin 
Model change is an ongoing process that should be frequently discussed with the supervisor. 
 
12.2.4 External consultants assisting the risk assessment 
 
Here 
• 8 participants stated that they use (or have used) external consultants in the risk 
assessment process, 2 of them for ongoing assistance, 4 of them only for some issues 
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(introducing the model, problematic issues or in some local sub-units). It is interesting 
to note that one single consultant firm is engaged by 4 different participants. 
• 5 participants said they do not use external consultants.   
    
BaFin 
The use of external consultants assisting in the risk assessment process is not required. 
 
12.2.5 Calculations done on group and sub-unit levels 
 
Both, group and sub-units are involved in risk capital calculations. In most cases 
(approximately 80%) we observed the following: 
 
Group providing/ responsible for:     
• market parameter, market shocks, scenario generation 
•  aggregation and diversification  work, capital  Reallocation 
• stress tests for solvency requirements 
• dealing with  operational risk. 
Sub-units do…      
• calculation of (standalone) risk capital requirement 
• cash flow projections 
• aggregation on sub-unit level. 
 
A bottom-up approach is performed in most cases; this takes burden off the group, if the sub-
units are acting according to the model and guidelines set up by the group (central risk 
management unit) and if the IT systems are harmonized. Models developed at the local level, 
in line with the group specifications, will be better placed to pick up risks and issues specific 
to the local markets and products. The group should keep the last word on model questions, 
usage of data and, of course, aggregation and diversification. 
 
12.2.6 Frequency and Duration of the calculations  
 
We have observed that  
• 4 participants perform yearly calculations 
• 4 participants perform half-yearly calculations 
• 4 participants perform quarterly calculations 
• 1 participant does monthly calculations. 
 
It was mentioned by 2 participants that for some risk types (market risk and/or credit risk) risk 
capital calculations are done with a higher frequency (quarterly instead of yearly). A higher 
frequency of calculations on sub-unit level was not reported to us. 
 
BaFin 
We expect a quarterly requirement on higher levels of aggregation and higher frequencies for 
sub-portfolios that are more dynamically managed. 
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As for the duration of the calculations, we observed runtimes ranging from 2 weeks up to 3 
months, most participants ranging uniformly in between (2 participants would or could not 
give exact runtimes) as seen from the following diagram: 
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For a complete group risk calculation the following problems slowing the speed of the 
calculations were mentioned: 
• Update of data (present data not available, embedded value results not up-to-date…) 
• Feeding the data, data review, plausibility checks 
• Tough timelines for producing reports 
• Technical and organizational difficulties in gathering data from the individual sub-
units 
• Governance processes. 
Some participants stated that the tough timelines for reporting (closure of the balance sheet) 
set up by the company’s management were one of the greatest hurdles. 
 
To overcome some of the problems the following measures are taken or considered 
• Missing data is estimated 
• Run of the model with old  (last year’s) data to keep timelines  
• Building an “approximation model” to speed up calculation 
• Harmonizing the IT-(reporting) systems. 
 
To expect an upper limit for the runtime of one day is completely out of question if one takes 
the whole process including the work done in sub-units into account, and not just the 
aggregation of a few spread sheet numbers by the central risk management.  
 
BaFin 
We expect an upper limit of one day.  
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12.3 Tools 
 
We observed a clear picture: All the participants are using in-house developments (up to even 
their own scenario generator), and all (up to one) also use external software. But whenever 
external software is used, the participants prefer to operate them in-house rather than to 
depend on external resources (only one company would consider the latter as a possibility). 
Among the software tools used are the asset scenario generator by Barrie and Hibbert (widely 
used), Moses, Prophet, Remetrica, Moody’s (KMV)…(see also Section 12.3.1) 
  
An internal model is only well understood if it is worked by in-house resources (one company 
even mentioned that for this it has to be developed by in-house resources). There is a clear 
signal that the companies assign importance to working with adequate models, which they 
fully understand and control. 
 
BaFin 
The main requirement for outsourcing is that the management board must still be able to 
manage the risks and the supervisor has access to all the information he needs to examine the 
model.  
 
12.3.1 IT platforms and infrastructure 
 
To emphasize the variety of IT platforms and software tools in use, we provide excerpts of 
some of the answers given: 
 
• Asset risk modelling is supported by the Barrie and Hibbert scenario generator; the 
overall calculations are done via Excel. Calculations are outsourced to MatLab or 
internal software developments 
• Current tools employ Mathematica, MatLab, Visual Basic, Visual Basic for 
Applications, Excel and Access as well as C and C++ proprietary programs 
• PCs with windows for hardware and Remetrica from Benfield are used as main tool, 
but also self developed pricing tools to fit liability models and own ESG developed in 
Visual Basic 
• Usual IT structure (PC's) is being used, but new solutions are contemplated  
• Models are mainly run on standalone PCs or networks of PCs. Some models are 
implemented in standard Office software (EXCEL, Visual Basic), for others, external 
proprietary software has been developed  
• ESG (provided by consultancy Barrie and Hibbert), Prophet (in life modelling)  . 
            Aggregation done using Visual Basis and EXCEL 
• EXCEL and Windows 2000 
• Moses, Prophet and Atlas are in use for most liabilities.  On the asset side there are 
many systems covering many asset classes 
• Various platforms, mainly EXCEL spreadsheets are used 
• Depending on the needs the appropriate hard/software is used 
• The individual models are mostly EXCEL models. Some parts are on Access, KMV, 
RMS, or Igloo. Data storage and transfer to group center is done via an Oracle 
database 
• S+ and EXCEL are used. 
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This may also give a hint as to a somewhat small degree of industry wide standardisation. 
 
It seems that management information is still mainly done manually or by presentation and is 
seemingly not automatized. Not half of the participants seem to have a separate IT system for 
reporting. 
 
Typical answers regarding IT systems used for reporting were e.g. 
 
• IT systems used for reporting vary by business unit. At a group level reporting is 
bespoke, but management information is being developed   
• The risk capital allocation on the sub-units and below is fed into the annual planning 
system. A management information system is under development and it is planned to 
include risk capital figures 
• “Risk Dashboards” are planned in near future 
• Visual Basic with EXCEL and Database technology is intended for use 
• The output from the model is used for financial reporting and for financial 
management.  As such the output is transferred into local IT systems 
• There is no separate IT system for reporting. Each business has its own system. 
Different systems are used 
• The data transfer to group center is done in a separate IT system. However, this is not 
linked to standard MIS system and reports are produced manually. 
 
One could think of having a unified IT reporting system throughout the company: 
         Sub-units  ?  risk management unit  ?   company’s management 
at least in the cases where the main calculations are done on the sub-units level. This would 
not only clarify the reporting process (also in the view of the regulators) but also strongly link 
the company’s management to the risk controlling procedure. 
As one can deduce from the answers the first arrow seems to be automized but not on a single 
system (though with some participants, yes), and the second arrow seems to be done manually 
or verbally (special spreadsheets, meetings, presentations…), at present. 
  
BaFin 
There are no requirements as to which IT tools are to be used. We expect separate IT systems 
for risk control, termed “middle office” in banking, which are separate from the “front office” 
systems used by traders and sales persons and from the “back office” systems used for 
contract settlement and accounting. 
 
12.3.2 Harmonising the systems 
 
We observed that for all participants different systems are in use for capital calculations.  
This is largely due to  
• The company’s history: taking over new business lines and units also may import new 
IT systems 
• Without an integrated internal model and the sub-units more operating on their own 
there was less need to harmonise the systems 
• Different IT systems seemed to be necessary for different LoBs. 
 
Concerning harmonisation, we have observed all kind of answers, ranging from an eager 
struggle for harmonisation (“yes, hoping to harmonise the systems”), over a reserved 
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viewpoint (“harmonising the system where deemed appropriate”) to a deliberate rejection of 
any harmonisation work (“no plans to do any harmonisation”).  
 
Although pulling together data from different database systems (sometimes even by “copy & 
paste”) is admittedly a source of error and at least time consuming, more than half of the 
participants are NOT intending to harmonise the systems in spite of the possible benefits. 
As reasons for this were given 
• because of the fast development of the methodology one does not believe in 
standardised monolithic software environments  
• clear and precise definitions of outputs enable an easy aggregation of data, so there is 
no need for harmonisation 
• there is a need for different IT platforms for different businesses. 
 
Even if the majority of the participants seem to be satisfied with their status quo, we would 
like to propose harmonisation and integration of the systems being done whenever possible 
and appropriate. 
 
BaFin 
There is no requirement for harmonisation. 
 
12.4 Data Management 
 
Not all participants provided (exhaustive) answers here (“A wide range of data inputs and 
processes are in place in order to calculate all the required information used for the internal 
risk models.”), some are still in the building-up phase, some are somehow reluctant in giving 
information obviously considering it a delicate matter. In any case, from what we have seen 
from the participants, data management and processing of the data is probably the most 
challenging aspect (see also the comments in Section 4.3 “Major obstacles in development 
and use of internal models”).  
 
12.4.1 Validation and reconciliation of input data  
 
We observed different ways of data validation. Very common is the reconciliation of input 
data with previous period data followed by investigations whenever large changes are 
observed (if necessary this leads to a new evaluation of data sources in rare cases). 
Validation and reconciliation may be done by applying set-up tests, case by case cross checks, 
additional plausibility checks … or by human judgement based on experience.  
Another way of data validation is the external check-off made by independent firms (e.g. the 
use of audited embedded value data). 
Data may be collected, analysed and distributed by a central corporate referee group operating 
under the CFO or a Chief Operating Officer. 
 
12.4.2 Setting and documentation of assumptions 
 
In most cases central functional departments are responsible for the setting (and 
documentation) of assumptions. The documentation is then also done centrally and 
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documented separately or the assumptions are set and recorded within the computer 
programmes constituting the model. Concerning documentation see also Section 12.1.2. 
 
12.4.3 Pre- and post-model data adjustments 
 
Pre-model data adjustments occur following data integrity and data plausibility checks, 
correcting gross errors in the data. They are performed by some of the participants.  
Post-model data adjustments follow the review the input data on basis of the outcome of the 
model. The review is done in form of cross-checks, but data adjustments are as a rule not 
carried out with most of the participants. 
 
12.4.4 Frequency of update   
 
All the participants update their input data at least once a year (with the end-of year data), 
about 1/3 perform a half-year and about 1/3 even a quarterly update. Whenever possible an 
up-date is made prior to each calculation (see also Section 12.2.6). Naturally, market data 
(e.g. market value of different asset classes) are updated with a higher frequency (typically 
quarterly) than e.g. liability data (typically yearly). 
 
12.4.5 Source of data (e.g. external data pools) 
 
For nearly all participants the vast majority of data is provided by internal sources such as 
internal loss data, internal policyholders’ data, internal frequency and severity estimations as 
well as expert opinion from internal economists. External sources were mentioned in 
connection with external loss databases (in connection with operational risk), estimation of  
investment markets’ parameters (e.g. volatilities) calculated on basis of historical time series 
from financial information providers, insurance data from accounting or Embedded Value 
Systems or economic scenarios from external consultancy (e.g. Barrie and Hibbert). 
  
12.4.6 Manual vs. automatic feed (e.g. automatic link to group 
databases) 
 
Here the answer “mostly manual feed” was observed in most of the cases, only 4 participants 
mentioned automatic feed in connection with market parameters, data transformation from a 
data base into EXCEL, and automatic generation of input data.  
It must be mentioned that manual data feed, although a common source of errors, is a 
deliberate choice within some participants and not going to be abandoned for the sake of 
learning, getting a deeper feeling and understanding of the model. 
 
12.4.7 Storage 
 
No clear picture obtained from the (few) answers here; in the extreme case everything, the 
model, the input data and output data are stored on a single local PC. 
  
BaFin 
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Minimum quality of input data to the model as well as the quality of data verification 
processes is one of the requirements that will be checked in an examination.  
 103
